Where Are My Children … and My Rights? Parental Rights Termination as a Consequence of Deportation by Hall, C. Elizabeth
HALL IN PRINTER PROOF.DOC 2/10/2011 10:16:50 PM 
 
 
WHERE ARE MY CHILDREN . . . AND MY 
RIGHTS? PARENTAL RIGHTS TERMINATION 
AS A CONSEQUENCE OF DEPORTATION 
C. ELIZABETH HALL† 
ABSTRACT 
  The U.S. Supreme Court has set out a constitutional framework 
under which termination-of-parental-rights cases must be adjudicated 
in state courts. In all cases, this framework requires proof of parental 
unfitness by clear and convincing evidence before parental rights can 
be terminated, even when the parents in question are illegal 
immigrants. Despite this framework, in a rash of recently published 
cases, courts have terminated the parental rights of illegal immigrant 
parents without regard for these requirements. Those who work 
closely with immigrants fear that the published instances are merely 
the tip of the iceberg. 
  This Note aims to shed light on this problem by discussing 
instances of such termination and identifying reasons that may have 
led courts to terminate parental rights outside of the constitutional 
framework. After identifying two primary reasons—cultural bias 
against immigrants and prison conditions that render maintaining 
parent-child relationships difficult—this Note suggests possible 
legislative changes that may decrease the number of such 
terminations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On May 22, 2007, Encarnación Bail Romero, an illegal 
immigrant, was taken into Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE) custody during a raid on a Carthage, Missouri poultry 
processing plant where she worked.1 Her son, Carlos, was ultimately 
placed in the custody of an American couple who petitioned for the 
termination of Ms. Bail’s parental rights so that they could adopt 
Carlos.2 The petition was filed on October 5, 2007, less than five 
months after Ms. Bail was taken into custody; the petition was served 
on Ms. Bail on October 16, two days before the termination hearing.3 
Two DLA Piper attorneys took on Ms. Bail’s case,4 which 
subsequently attained a significantly heightened public profile.5 
Consequently, commentators and legal scholars began to take note of 
what some fear is a widespread problem in the United States—the 
termination of illegal immigrants’ parental rights as a result of the 
initiation of deportation proceedings against them.6 
For now, Ms. Bail’s custody battle has a potentially encouraging 
outcome: on January 25, 2011, the Missouri Supreme Court reversed 
the appellate court’s decision and remanded the case for a new trial 
on all claims.7 Every supreme court judge agreed that the trial court 
 
 1. S.M. v. E.M.B.R. (In re Adoption of C.M.B.R.), No. SC 91141, slip op. at 3 (Mo. Jan. 
25, 2011) (en banc), available at http://www.courts.mo.gov/file.jsp?id=43941. 
 2. S.M. v. E.M.B.R. (In re Adoption of C.M.B.R.), No. SD 30342, 2010 WL 2841486, at *2 
(Mo. Ct. App. July 21, 2010); see also Ginger Thompson, After Losing Freedom, Some 
Immigrants Face Loss of Custody of Their Children, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2009, at A15 
(discussing details of Ms. Bail’s case). For more on Ms. Bail’s case, see infra notes 85–94 and 
accompanying text. 
 3. S.M., slip. op. at 5. 
 4. Marcia Yablon-Zug, Separation, Deportation, Termination 26 n.129 (July 26, 2010) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1648999. 
 5. Ms. Bail has told her story to at least one congressional committee. See Emily Butera, 
Are Children of Immigrants Becoming Needless Statistics in the Child Welfare System?, 
RESTORE FAIRNESS (Nov. 16, 2009), http://restorefairness.org/2009/11/are-children-of-
immigrants-becoming-needless-statistics-in-the-child-welfare-system (“When Encarnación told 
her story during a briefing in the House of Representatives last week you could have heard a 
pin drop.”). At the time of her testimony, Ms. Bail was awaiting deportation from the United 
States. See id. (noting that, as of November 2009, Ms. Bail was “scheduled for deportation to 
Guatemala in February [2010]”). 
 6. See infra notes 16–20 and accompanying text. 
 7. S.M., slip op. at 45–46. 
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had “plainly erred.”8 The supreme court split 4–3, however, on the 
appropriate remedy. The dissenters argued that, based on the 
admitted miscarriage of justice, Ms. Bail should be given custody of 
her son immediately.9 The majority remanded for a new trial instead,10 
despite its agreement that the case was “a travesty in its egregious 
procedural errors, its long duration, and its impact on Mother, 
Adoptive Parents, and, most importantly, Child.”11 The remand 
means that, even with a favorable outcome at the trial level, much 
more time will pass before Ms. Bail and Carlos reunite.12  
It is difficult to determine exactly how many illegal immigrant 
parents have found themselves in Ms. Bail’s situation. And in many 
other cases, second chances at review—such as Ms. Bail will receive—
are not forthcoming. As recently as 2009, the Virginia Court of 
Appeals affirmed the termination of an illegal immigrant father’s 
parental rights, in part because his deportation prevented him from 
maintaining contact with his children.13 Similarly, in 2005, the 
Tennessee Court of Appeals upheld the termination of the parental 
rights of a Nigerian illegal immigrant after she was taken into 
deportation proceedings.14 
At least two other cases have dealt with termination of parental 
rights as a result of entering deportation proceedings, both with 
results favorable to the immigrant parents.15 Despite the relatively 
 
 8. Id., slip op. at 45; see also id., slip op. at 46 n.25 (describing points of agreement and 
disagreement among the judges). 
 9. See id., slip op. at 46 n.25 (“The dissenting members believe passionately that custody 
of Child should be returned to Mother without further proceedings. That result can be reached 
only by disregarding the law.”). 
 10. Id., slip op. at 45–46. 
 11. Id., slip op. at 46 n.25. 
 12. See Missouri Ruling Extends Legal Battle for Immigrant’s Son, CNN (Jan. 26, 2011), 
http://articles.cnn.com/2011-01-26/us/missouri.immigrant.child_1_parental-rights-adoptive-
parents-maternal-rights?_s=PM:US (“[M]any more months are likely to pass before it’s known 
who will have custody of [the] 4-year-old boy . . . .”). 
 13. Perez-Velasquez v. Culpeper Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., No. 0360-09-4, 2009 WL 
1851017, at *2, *4 (Va. Ct. App. June 30, 2009). For discussion of another situation in which 
deportation made it difficult for an immigrant parent to meet the requirements necessary to 
regain custody of her children, see infra note 123 and accompanying text. 
 14. State Dep’t of Children’s Servs. v. Ahmad, No. M2004-02604-COA-R3-PT, 2005 WL 
975339, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2005). 
 15. See State v. Maria L. (In re Interest of Angelica L.), 767 N.W.2d 74, 96 (Neb. 2009) 
(overturning the lower court’s termination of an illegal immigrant mother’s parental rights after 
she was taken into deportation proceedings); Fairfax Cnty. Dep’t of Family Servs. v. Ibrahim, 
No. 0821-00-4, 2000 WL 1847638, at *4 (Va. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2000) (affirming the lower court’s 
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small number of cases that have come before appellate courts and the 
relatively high percentage of those cases that have had parent-
friendly outcomes, there is reason to suspect that parent-friendly 
outcomes are the exception, not the rule. Professor Marcia Yablon-
Zug has noted that although decisions to terminate illegal 
immigrants’ parental rights are “frequently reversed” on appeal, the 
parents often do not appeal, either because they are too poor or 
because they have already been deported and are unable to access the 
U.S. legal system.16 In addition, access to information about these 
cases is scarce because records are sealed in most cases.17 
Reports from staffers of legal organizations confirm that this 
problem is serious and far-reaching. Based on information from its 
immigrant clients, the National Network for Immigrant and Refugee 
Rights has observed the growing “practice of stripping away 
immigrants’ parental rights . . . on the basis of their immigration 
status, often in the quartet of courts, immigration, local law 
enforcement and foster care agencies.”18 Similarly, Legal Momentum, 
another nonprofit that provides legal services to immigrants, has 
commented, 
The separation of U.S. citizen children and immigrant parents due to 
immigration raids and detentions has emerged as a nation-wide 
issue. . . . A pattern is emerging in which some state departments of 
social services are taking U.S. born children from undocumented 
immigrant parents and placing them in foster care, in violation of the 
undocumented immigrant [parents’] right to custody of their 
children.19 
 
refusal to terminate an illegal immigrant father’s parental rights after he was deported). 
 16. Yablon-Zug, supra note 4, at 26 & n.129. 
 17. Id. at 26 n.129; see also Butera, supra note 5 (“Because it is difficult to gather accurate 
data about the undocumented population it is impossible to know how many children have 
already been affected.”). 
 18. Human Rights Abuses Against Immigrant Parents, NAT’L NETWORK FOR IMMIGRANT 
& REFUGEE RTS., http://org2.democracyinaction.org/o/5702/t/4329/content.jsp?content_KEY
=1766 (last visited Feb. 8, 2011). 
 19. Immigration Raids Separate Children from Parents, LEGAL MOMENTUM, http://www.
legalmomentum.org/our-work/immigrant-women-program/immigration-raids-separate.html 
(last visited Feb. 8, 2011). 
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Further, a number of people who work closely with illegal immigrants 
have recounted first-hand stories that indicate the increasing 
frequency of situations like Ms. Bail’s.20 
This Note traces the problem of termination due to deportation 
through recent cases and suggests legislative changes that would 
decrease the number of illegal immigrants who lose their children 
because of the commencement of deportation proceedings. Part I 
discusses the constitutional background that governs termination of 
parental rights for all parents, including illegal immigrant parents. 
Despite their constitutional right to raise their children absent proof 
of parental unfitness,21 these individuals are losing parental rights as a 
consequence of their detainment for immigration violations, and 
without adequate determinations that they are unfit parents.22 Part II 
discusses how, within the boundaries of that constitutional 
framework, state and federal laws normally operate to terminate 
parental rights. Part III argues that trial judges have departed from 
the proper application of the constitutional procedures in the few 
reported termination cases involving illegal immigrants. That Part 
goes on to identify two problems—cultural bias and prison-life 
constraints—that cause courts to misapply the law, and it explains 
how state and federal laws exacerbate the problem. Part IV then 
discusses three potential solutions—at the state, federal, and 
international levels—that together address both cultural bias and 
prison-life issues. Implementation of any number of these solutions 
may begin to remedy a problem that those closest to it believe to be 
widespread. 
I.  THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF PARENTS 
Family law issues are indisputably the province of state law and 
state courts.23 The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has found that the 
 
 20. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 2 (“In visits to detention centers across the country, 
Ms. Schriro [an adviser to the Homeland Security Secretary] said, she has heard accounts of 
parents losing contact or custody of their children.”); id. (“[L]awyers and advocates for 
immigrants say that cases like [Ms. Bail’s] are popping up across the country as crackdowns 
against illegal immigrants thrust local courts into transnational custody battles and leave 
thousands of children in limbo.”); Butera, supra note 5 (“[M]y inbox has been flooded with 
stories such as Encarnación Bail Romero’s.”). 
 21. See infra Part I. 
 22. See infra Part III.A. 
 23. See Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 625 (1987) (“[T]he whole subject of the domestic 
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Constitution restricts states’ authority to interfere with family 
decisions and rights.24 The Court has repeatedly placed great 
emphasis on the right of natural parents to the “companionship, care, 
custody, and management of [their] children.”25 The right has been 
deemed “far more precious than any property right”26 and one that 
“undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful 
countervailing interest, protection.”27 Indeed, the Court considers this 
interest fundamental,28 protected by the Equal Protection and Due 
Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.29 
Termination of parental rights is perhaps the greatest 
interference that the state can impose on the fundamental right of 
parents to raise their children and is consequently approached with 
great skepticism by the Supreme Court. As the Court has noted, 
“When the State initiates a parental rights termination proceeding, it 
seeks not merely to infringe [on a] fundamental liberty interest, but to 
end it.”30 Consequently, the termination of parental rights “‘must be 
accomplished by procedures meeting the requisites of the Due 
Process Clause.’”31 
To avoid undue deprivations of parental rights, the Supreme 
Court has put into place procedural safeguards designed to protect 
the fundamental liberty interests of the parent. As a whole, the 
procedural safeguards as set out by the Supreme Court require 
several steps. First, the parent is entitled to a hearing, which takes 
 
relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States and not to the 
laws of the United States.” (quoting In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593–94 (1890))). 
 24. See generally Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (plurality opinion) (addressing 
whether grandparents may be given visitation rights against the wishes of the child’s parents); 
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (addressing the evidentiary standard required to prove 
unfitness before parental rights may be terminated); Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 
(1981) (addressing whether indigent parents must be provided an attorney in termination-of-
parental-rights proceedings); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (addressing whether 
unfitness must be proven before parental rights may be terminated). 
 25. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651. 
 26. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 758–59. 
 27. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27 (quoting Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651). 
 28. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 759; see also Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65–66 (plurality opinion) (“In 
light of this extensive precedent, it cannot now be doubted that the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning 
the care, custody, and control of their children.”). 
 29. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651. 
 30. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 759. 
 31. Id. at 753 (quoting Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 37 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)). 
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place in state court, to determine whether she is a fit parent.32 At this 
hearing, “[statutory] allegations of abuse or neglect are presented to 
the court, which must determine whether there is a sufficient factual 
and legal basis for state intervention.”33 A parent’s rights can be 
terminated only if she is found to be unfit.34 A finding of unfitness 
requires a clear statutory basis and clear and convincing evidence that 
the facts of the case support that finding under the statute.35 Then—
and only then—may the court go on to consider the best interests of 
the child.36 Only if the court finds that the parent is unfit and that 
termination would be in the child’s best interests may the parent’s 
rights be terminated. 
These procedural safeguards are guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment—as specified in Stanley v. Illinois37 and Santosky v. 
Kramer38—and thus they apply not only to U.S. citizens but also to 
illegal immigrant parents. In one of its earliest discrimination cases, 
the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s protections, which 
are granted to “any person within [a state’s] jurisdiction,”39 are “not 
confined to the protection of citizens.”40 Later, in Plyler v. Doe,41 the 
 
 32. In its earliest case addressing the termination of parental rights, the Court determined 
that “all . . . parents are constitutionally entitled to a hearing on their fitness before their 
children are removed from their custody.” Stanley, 405 U.S. at 658. 
 33. HOMER H. CLARK, JR. & ANN LAQUER ESTIN, DOMESTIC RELATIONS CASES AND 
PROBLEMS 561 (7th ed. 2005). 
 34. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 658. 
 35. In Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), the Supreme Court held that “the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment demands . . . [that] [b]efore a State may sever 
completely and irrevocably the rights of parents in their natural child . . . the State [must] 
support its allegations [of parental unfitness] by at least clear and convincing evidence.” Id. at 
747–48. 
 36. See id. at 760 (suggesting that until the unfitness of a parent is proven, the parent and 
the child have the same best interests, by stating, “until the State proves parental unfitness, the 
child and his parents share a vital interest in preventing erroneous termination of their natural 
relationship”); CLARK & ESTIN, supra note 33, at 571 (“[T]ermination of parental rights must be 
premised on parental unfitness rather than a determination of the child’s best interests . . . .”); 
see also JOHN DEWITT GREGORY, PETER N. SWISHER & SHERYL L. WOLF, UNDERSTANDING 
FAMILY LAW 191 (3d ed. 2005) (“[I]t is only after a determination of parental unfitness that the 
best interests of the child will outweigh other considerations in a proceeding for termination of 
parental rights.”). 
 37. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
 38. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982). 
 39. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 40. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886); see also Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 
723, 781 (2008) (assuming that aliens have due process rights in determining that they are 
entitled to habeas corpus); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) (holding that 
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Court went on to explain that “[w]hatever his status under the 
immigration laws, an alien is surely a ‘person’ in any ordinary sense of 
that term. Aliens, even aliens whose presence in this country is 
unlawful, have long been recognized as ‘persons’ guaranteed due 
process of law by the . . . Fourteenth Amendment[].”42 The Court has 
given no indication that parental rights of immigrants should be 
treated as an exception to these principles.43 Indeed, even some courts 
that have deprived illegal immigrants of their parental rights through 
 
“all persons within the territory of the United States are entitled to the protection guaranteed 
by [the Fifth and Sixth Amendments], and that even aliens shall not . . . be deprived of life, 
liberty or property without due process of law”). 
 41. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
 42. Id. at 210 (emphasis added). 
 43. See S. Adam Ferguson, Note, Not Without My Daughter: Deportation and the 
Termination of Parental Rights, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 85, 92 (2007) (“[T]he fundamental right to 
raise children [is not limited] to U.S. citizens only.”); see also Yablon-Zug, supra note 4, at 10–11 
(“The constitutional rights of parents are not confined to citizens. Immigrant parents also have 
the right to the care and custody of their children.” (footnote omitted)). Because of the 
importance of the parental rights held by illegal immigrants, if, by following the procedures set 
out by the Supreme Court, an illegal immigrant parent is found to be fit, and thus retains 
custody of her child, the parent has the right to take the child to the parent’s country of origin 
when the parent is deported. This is the case even if the child is a U.S. citizen. See David B. 
Thronson, Choiceless Choices: Deportation and the Parent-Child Relationship, 6 NEV. L.J. 1165, 
1189–97 (2006) (discussing cases that hold that parents may take their U.S. citizen children with 
them when they are deported from the United States). Numerous circuits have held that no 
constitutional rights of citizen children are violated when their parents are deported, even if that 
deportation results in the child’s exit from the United States. See, e.g., Garcia v. Holder, 320 F. 
App’x 288, 290–91 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Though [the alien’s] minor daughter is a United States 
citizen, her constitutional rights are not affected by the deportation of [her] parent, even where 
her de facto deportation will result.” (citing Perdido v. INS, 420 F.2d 1179, 1181 (5th Cir. 
1969))); Niang v. Gonzales, 492 F.3d 505, 512 n.11 (4th Cir. 2007) (“While . . . U.S. citizen 
children . . . may be forced to accompany their parents to the country of removal, we and our 
sister circuits have held that this . . . is countenanced by the INA and not violative of the 
children’s constitutional rights.”); see also Kif Augustine-Adams, The Plenary Power Doctrine 
After September 11, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 701, 708 (2005) (noting that “[v]irtually all the U.S. 
circuit courts have denied that any constitutional right of a citizen . . . is violated or even 
implicated when the citizen’s noncitizen family members are excluded from the United States or 
not allowed to remain here”). The deportation of an illegal immigrant parent and the parent’s 
removal of the citizen child “merely postpone[s]” the child’s right to live in the United States 
until the child is old enough to exercise that right; it does not end the right entirely. Thronson, 
supra, at 1194 (quoting Acosta v. Gaffney, 558 F.2d 1153, 1158 (3d Cir. 1977)); see also Ayala-
Flores v. INS, 662 F.2d 444, 446 (6th Cir. 1981) (holding that the child in question would be able 
to decide to return to the United States and exercise her citizenship rights when she “reach[ed] 
the age of discretion” and that her rights would not be permanently barred because of her 
parents’ decision to take her to Mexico with them when they were deported). Finally, though 
the Supreme Court has not addressed this specific issue, it has noted that citizens may be 
“compelled by family . . . reasons” to “reside abroad indefinitely” and that doing so will not 
cause the citizen to “suffer[] loss of citizenship.” Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168–69 (1964). 
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termination have implicitly acknowledged that those protections 
apply by citing them as the framework within which the courts’ 
decisions must be made.44 
II.  APPLYING THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS: STATE AND 
FEDERAL LAWS 
Against this constitutional background, state and federal laws 
determine when termination proceedings should be initiated against a 
parent, and state laws determine what qualifies as unfitness in those 
proceedings. Although the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence regarding 
the termination of parental rights provides the framework for 
handling such cases, it is up to the states to develop laws that dictate 
the actual termination of rights. These laws, designed with the best of 
intentions, have proven to be an enormous hurdle to some illegal 
immigrant parents who attempt to defend their parental rights from 
within the confines of deportation-related proceedings. Through a 
federal funds law,45 the federal government also plays a role in 
determining when termination proceedings will be initiated against a 
parent. An understanding of how these rules operate within the 
constitutional framework is necessary to understand the problems 
facing immigrant parents in some courts. 
A.  The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 
The federal Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA)46 
was adopted to “achieve permanence for children in the foster care 
system.”47 The ASFA is a federal funds act,48 so states receiving 
 
 44. See, e.g., State Dep’t of Children’s Servs. v. Ahmad, No. M2004-02604-COA-R3-PT, 
2005 WL 975339, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2005) (stating that “[a] court may terminate a 
parent’s parental rights if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that one of the statutory 
grounds for termination of parental rights has been established and that the termination of such 
rights is in the best interests of the child” and citing Stanley v. Illinois as governing law). 
 45. A federal funds act is one that “[c]ondition[s] federal funding upon state performance 
of a particular function.” MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32390, 
VIENNA CONVENTION ON CONSULAR RELATIONS: OVERVIEW OF U.S. IMPLEMENTATION AND 
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (ICJ) INTERPRETATION OF CONSULAR NOTIFICATION 
REQUIREMENTS 21 (2004); see also infra note 251 and accompanying text. 
 46. ASFA, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
42 U.S.C.). 
 47. Libby S. Adler, The Meanings of Permanence: A Critical Analysis of the Adoption and 
Safe Families Act of 1997, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 1 (2001). 
 48. 42 U.S.C. § 670 (2006) (“The sums made available under this section shall be used for 
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federal funds for foster care maintenance payments or adoption 
incentives are obliged to abide by its requirements.49 Of greatest 
relevance here, the ASFA requires states to initiate termination 
proceedings against parents if their children have been in foster care 
for fifteen of the preceding twenty-two months.50 There are three 
narrow exceptions,51 including if the child is being cared for by a 
relative under state supervision.52 Because the average sentence for an 
inmate exceeds fifteen months, these guidelines affect a considerable 
number of parents whose children must go into foster care during 
their incarceration.53 
 
making payments to States which have submitted, and had approved by the Secretary, State 
plans under this part.”). 
 49. The ASFA falls under Title IV-E of the Social Security Act. This Title provides states 
with “such sums [of federal funds] as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this part.” 
Id. The provisions of the part are designed to “enabl[e] each State to provide . . . foster care and 
transitional independent living programs for [certain] children . . . and adoption assistance for 
children with special needs.” Id. 
 50. Id. § 675(5)(E) (“[I]n the case of a child who has been in foster care under the 
responsibility of the State for 15 of the most recent 22 months . . . the State shall file a petition to 
terminate the parental rights of the child’s parents . . . .” (emphasis added)); see also Jade S. 
Laughlin, Bruce A. Arrigo, Kristie R. Blevins & Charisse T.M. Coston, Incarcerated Mothers 
and Child Visitation: A Law, Social Science, and Policy Perspective, 19 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 
215, 222 (2008) (“ASFA stipulates that when a child has been in the system for 15 months, 
parental rights can be terminated, making the child eligible for adoption. For criminally 
confined mothers who function as the primary care providers, this legislation poses a 
considerable threat to their children and to the family unit.”). 
 51. The three exceptions are that the child is being cared for by a relative, that the state 
agency has documented a compelling reason that filing such a petition is not in the best interests 
of the child, or that the state agency has not provided reasonable, required services to the family 
of the child. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E). 
 52. Id. (“[I]n the case of a child who has been in foster care . . . for 15 of the most recent 22 
months . . . the State shall file a petition to terminate the parental rights of the child’s 
parents . . . unless at the option of the State, the child is being cared for by a relative.” (emphasis 
added)). Many state versions of the Act have similar provisions. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-
317(1)(b), (2)(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2009) (adopting language similar to the ASFA); MD. CODE 
ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-525.1(b)(1)(i), .1(b)(3)(i) (LexisNexis 2006) (same); WYO. STAT. ANN. 
§ 14-3-431(m)(i) (2009) (same). Unfortunately, many illegal immigrant parents have difficulty 
finding a relative to care for their children while they are incarcerated. Additionally, if the only 
relatives available in the United States are illegal, it is unlikely that the state would sanction the 
child’s placement with those relatives to meet the statutory requirement, and the relatives may 
fear deportation if they do choose to provide care for the children of the incarcerated 
immigrant. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 2 (noting that Ms. Bail’s son was initially sent to live 
with two aunts but was later put into foster care when “[t]he women—each with three children 
of their own, no legal status, tiny apartments and little money” could no longer care for Carlos). 
Non-state-supervised care provided by a relative, such as non-state-sanctioned care by a relative 
illegally present in the United States, would not be sufficient to meet this exception. 
 53. See JEREMY TRAVIS, ELIZABETH CINCOTTA MCBRIDE & AMY SOLOMON, FAMILIES 
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In general, if a child has been in foster care for fifteen of the 
previous twenty-two months and does not qualify for any of the 
exceptions, a state will initiate proceedings against the child’s parents 
as required by the ASFA. At that time, the parent’s constitutional 
rights require that she be given a hearing on her fitness. If it is proven 
by clear and convincing evidence that the parent is unfit, the court 
then asks whether termination is in the best interests of the child. If it 
is, the parent’s rights are terminated.54 
What the ASFA does not do is establish that the parent has been 
unfit by virtue of leaving her child in foster care for the statutory 
period. On its face, the language of the statute merely requires that 
the state “file a petition to terminate the parental rights.”55 This 
phrasing, as well as its implementation by the courts,56 suggests that a 
child’s placement in foster care for the statutory period is only the 
beginning of the process of terminating parental rights. The 
remainder of the process must still be carried out under the ordinary 
constitutional procedures.57 Indeed, at least one court has explicitly 
 
LEFT BEHIND: THE HIDDEN COSTS OF INCARCERATION AND REENTRY 1, 6 (rev. 2005), 
available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/310882_families_left_behind.pdf (“Because 
women serve an average of 18 months in prison, many female inmates whose children are in 
nonrelative foster care may face the possibility of losing their parental rights.”); Creasie Finney 
Hairston, Prisoners and Families: Parenting Issues During Incarceration 7 (Dec. 2001) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/prison2home02/hairston.pdf 
(“The average prison stay is longer than the period in which termination procedures are 
required to begin . . . .”). 
 54. See supra notes 33–36 and accompanying text; see also CLARK & ESTIN, supra note 33, 
at 562 (noting that the ASFA must be “interpret[ed] and appl[ied]” in accordance with the 
constitutional procedures set out by the Supreme Court). 
 55. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E). 
 56. An example is a 2001 challenge to an Illinois statute that allowed a child’s presence in 
foster care for fifteen of the previous twenty-two months to be the basis for an unfitness 
determination. In re H.G., 757 N.E.2d 864, 866–67 (Ill. 2001). The statute was challenged on 
constitutional grounds. Id. at 868. The Supreme Court of Illinois held that the presumption of 
unfitness created by the mere fact of a child being in foster care for fifteen out of the previous 
twenty-two months was unconstitutional because it 
is not narrowly tailored to the compelling goal of identifying unfit parents because it 
fails to account for the fact that, in many cases, the length of a child’s stay in foster 
care has nothing to do with the parent’s ability or inability to safely care for the child 
but, instead, is due to circumstances beyond the parent’s control. 
Id. at 872. In so holding, the court required that unfitness be shown apart from the statutory 
timeframe requirements. Id. 
 57. Professors Homer Clark, Jr., and Ann Estin agree, stating, “Courts must interpret and 
apply the requirements of th[is] statute[] against a background of constitutional protections for 
parental rights.” CLARK & ESTIN, supra note 33, at 562; see also State v. Maria L. (In re Interest 
of Angelica L.), 767 N.W.2d 74, 92 (Neb. 2009) (“Regardless of the length of time a child is 
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held that “the fact that a child has been placed outside the home for 
15 or more of the most recent 22 months does not demonstrate 
parental unfitness” but instead “provides a guideline for what would 
be a reasonable time for parents to rehabilitate themselves to a 
minimum level of fitness.”58 Some state courts, however, have 
erroneously assumed that a child’s placement in foster care for fifteen 
of the previous twenty-two months is dispositive of unfitness, allowing 
the ASFA to play a substantive, rather than a procedural, role in the 
termination process.59 
B.  State Laws 
Beyond their application of the ASFA, state courts play another 
major role in termination proceedings. Family law issues are the 
province of state courts.60 Accordingly, it is state law that defines 
parental unfitness for termination purposes. States have varying rules 
on what constitutes unfitness, but there are several basic actions that 
virtually always constitute unfitness.61 The most relevant bases for the 
purposes of this Note are abandonment, including failure to support 
or maintain contact with the child, failure to remedy a persistent 
condition that caused the removal of the child, and failure to comply 
with a reunification or rehabilitation plan.62 
 
placed outside the home, it is always the State’s burden to prove by clear and convincing 
evidence that the parent is unfit . . . .”). 
 58. Maria L., 767 N.W.2d at 92. 
 59. See infra note 124 and accompanying text. 
 60. See supra note 23. 
 61. CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., GROUNDS FOR INVOLUNTARY TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS 2–3 (2010), 
available at http://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/groundtermin.pdf; 
see also GREGORY ET AL., supra note 36, at 184 (“Typical statutory grounds for termination of 
parental rights include abandonment, child abuse, neglect or dependency, [and] non-
support . . . .”). Failure to remedy a persistent condition that caused the child to be placed in 
foster care is another cause for termination of parental rights in many states. E.g., State Dep’t of 
Children’s Servs. v. Ahmad, No. M2004-02604-COA-R3-PT, 2005 WL 975339, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. Apr. 26, 2005); Perez-Velasquez v. Culpeper Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., No. 0360-09-4, 
2009 WL 1851017, at *2 n.2 (Va. Ct. App. June 30, 2009) (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-
283(C)(1) (2006)); Fairfax Cnty. Dep’t of Family Servs. v. Ibrahim, No. 0821-00-4, 2000 WL 
1847638, at *2–3 (Va. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2000). 
 62. E.g., S.M. v. E.M.B.R. (In re Adoption of C.M.B.R.), No. SC91141, slip op. at 1 (Mo. 
Jan. 25, 2011) (en banc), available at http://www.courts.mo.gov/file.jsp?id=43941; Maria L., 767 
N.W.2d at 84; Perez-Velasquez, 2009 WL 1851017, at *2 & n.1. 
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Abandonment typically includes a “failure to communicate with 
the child for a specified period of time, failure to provide support, or 
other evidence of an intent to relinquish parental claims to the 
child.”63 Some states require that, to support a finding of unfitness, the 
failure to communicate or other acts of abandonment must be 
willful.64 Others require that the actions purported to constitute 
abandonment, including failure to maintain contact, must have been 
within the parent’s control.65 
Abandonment may also be defined to encompass other bases for 
a finding of unfitness, such as failure to support or maintain contact 
with the child. Failure to provide support, whether as a stand-alone 
requirement or as a factor showing abandonment, is typically 
demonstrated when the parent, for a particular period of time, has 
“‘failed significantly without justifiable cause to provide support.’”66 
Another common statutory basis for finding unfitness in these 
immigrant cases is failure to remedy the persistent condition that led 
to the removal of the child. This failure is generally established by a 
showing that the circumstances that led to the child’s removal have 
not changed and are not likely to change in the near future.67 It 
appears that it is unnecessary for the conditions to be completely 
remedied by the time of the termination hearing, so long as they will 
be remedied reasonably soon after the proceedings.68 
Failure to comply with a reunification or rehabilitation plan can 
also be sufficient grounds for termination of parental rights. In 
general, the failure to comply must be substantial or material to the 
overall goal of providing a fit life for the child.69 Before terminating 
 
 63. GREGORY ET AL., supra note 36, at 186. 
 64. See CLARK & ESTIN, supra note 33, at 580 (noting that some courts have found that 
“acts of abandonment must be willful”). 
 65. See GREGORY ET AL., supra note 36, at 187 (“Lack of parental contact might not 
constitute abandonment if its cause is not within the parent’s control.”). 
 66. Id. at 189 (quoting In re J.J.J., 718 P.2d 948, 949 (Alaska 1986)). Support includes food, 
clothing, shelter, and education expenses, as well as other care necessary for the child’s 
development. Id. at 188–89 (citing MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.221(1)(b)(2) (West 1992) (current 
version at MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260C.301(1)(b)(2) (West 2007))). 
 67. E.g., In re M.J.B., 140 S.W.3d 643, 658 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (terminating parental 
rights where the mother was unable to show that she would “be able at any time in the 
foreseeable future to provide . . . the financial support [and the structured living environment] 
that the children need”). 
 68. See id. at 657–58 (noting that there was “very little likelihood that the[] conditions 
would be remedied at an early date” or in the “foreseeable future”). 
 69. Failure to comply with parts of the plan that are not material to this end will generally 
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parental rights on this basis, the state generally must take reasonable 
steps to assist the parent in complying with the plan,70 and the plan 
must be one with which the parent is able to comply.71 
III.  SETTLED LAW, UNSETTLING OUTCOMES 
What is disconcerting about the cases addressing termination of 
illegal immigrants’ parental rights after deportation proceedings 
begin is the lack of strict adherence to the constitutional requirement 
that a parent be found unfit based on state statutory definitions. The 
cases, even those that do adhere to well-established constitutional 
principles, reveal two important factors that have allowed courts to 
terminate parental rights without a showing of unfitness. First, each 
court to address these matters has either displayed or noted a 
“culture clash” that resulted in passing over the question of parental 
fitness and moving directly to a best-interests analysis. That analysis 
easily devolves into a determination that “one environment or set of 
circumstances is superior to another.”72 
Second, the daily struggles that incarcerated parents face in 
maintaining sufficient contact with their children make it easier for 
courts to find the parents unfit, despite the efforts of the parents to 
contact their children and the system’s failure to aid them in doing 
so.73 This is exacerbated by the particular situation of immigrant 
detainees—incarceration far from the foster homes of their children 
 
not suffice for termination. See, e.g., 25 FLA. JUR. 2D Family Law § 292 (2010) (“The court must 
advise the parents that, if they fail to substantially comply with the case plan, their parental 
rights may be terminated . . . .” (emphasis added)); 4 NEB. PRAC. Juvenile Court Law & Practice 
§ 5:8 (2010) (“A parent’s failure to follow a court-ordered plan of rehabilitation cannot result in 
the termination of parental rights unless the terms of the plan are material to the situation, and 
to the basis of the adjudication.”). 
 70. See 25 FLA. JUR. 2D § 292 (“The parent must have had the substantial ability and a 
viable opportunity to comply with the case plan . . . .”). 
 71. See, e.g., id. (“[T]he Department must have made diligent efforts to assist the parent in 
meeting the goals of the plan and have made reasonable efforts to reunify the parent and 
child.”). 
 72. State v. Maria L. (In re Interest of Angelica L.), 767 N.W.2d 74, 94 (Neb. 2009); see also 
Butera, supra note 5 (“In some cases . . . judges base termination decisions on the fact that the 
mother does not have legal status and may be deported. In others, child welfare workers oppose 
family reunification because they think that a U.S. citizen child should not live in another 
country.”). 
 73. See infra Part III.C. 
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and frequent, unexpected moves to different detention centers, often 
out of state.74 
A combination of these factors has resulted in some courts failing 
to address the question of whether illegal immigrant parents are 
statutorily fit before going on to determine whether their rights 
should be terminated. In doing so, courts have failed either to apply 
the appropriate evidentiary standard in the fitness inquiry or to 
rigorously adhere to the statutory requirements for unfitness, even as 
they purport to apply the clear and convincing evidence standard. 
A.  Inadequate Inquiry into Unfitness 
In several recent cases, illegal immigrant parents have faced 
state-court termination hearings after being taken into deportation 
proceedings. In these cases, the issue has been whether the immigrant 
parent’s parental rights should be terminated, and, in each of these 
cases, at least one court that heard the case found that they should.75 
Admittedly, two of these cases were later reversed by higher courts, 
but as Professor Yablon-Zug suggests, such cases frequently do not 
reach states’ higher courts, where termination is more likely to be 
denied.76 It is, therefore, instructive to note the problems in the lower 
courts’ rationales even when their decisions are overturned, as they 
can illuminate why this problem exists. 
The outcomes in these recent cases are problematic for two 
reasons. First, in some cases, courts fail to apply the clear and 
convincing evidentiary standard to the fitness inquiry, even though 
the Supreme Court has made it clear that such a standard applies. 
Second, even when courts ostensibly apply the clear and convincing 
evidence standard, it is not clear that they properly apply the 
statutory requirements of finding abandonment, failure to remedy the 
persistent condition that caused the child to enter foster care, or 
failure to comply with the reunification plan before proceeding to a 
best-interests analysis. 
1. Failure to Apply the Clear and Convincing Evidence Standard.  
In at least one case, the clear and convincing evidence standard 
appears to have been wholly ignored by courts examining the 
 
 74. See infra Part III.C. 
 75. See infra Part III.A.1–2. 
 76. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
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question of a statutory basis for termination. Ostensibly, the Virginia 
Court of Appeals validated the lower court’s failure to apply the 
correct standard in 2009 when the appellate court upheld the trial 
court’s termination of the parental rights of a Guatemalan father who 
had been deported from the United States.77 Victor Perez-Velasquez, 
an illegal immigrant, was incarcerated when the Department of Social 
Services removed his children, and the Department offered him no 
services for reunification.78 The trial court terminated his parental 
rights in part because he failed to maintain adequate contact with his 
children, one statutory way to establish unfitness.79 The court did find 
a statutory basis for the termination,80 but the court referenced the 
clear and convincing standard only with respect to the best-interests 
inquiry and not with respect to the unfitness question.81 Statutory 
language and previous cases,82 as well as the Supreme Court’s holding 
in Santosky,83 demonstrate that this standard is required at the 
unfitness determination stage. 
2. Failure to Remain Faithful to the Requirements of Statutory 
Unfitness.  Even in cases in which courts purport to apply the clear 
and convincing evidence standard, there is good reason to question 
whether the standard was met, based on a failure to adhere to the 
 
 77. Perez-Velasquez v. Culpeper Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., No. 0360-09-4, 2009 WL 
1851017, at *1–2 (Va. Ct. App. June 30, 2009). 
 78. Id. at *1. 
 79. Id.; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-283(C)(1) (2010) (providing for termination of 
parental rights if a parent “without good cause, failed to maintain continuing contact” with the 
child). 
 80. For further discussion of the basis for the termination of Perez-Velasquez’s rights, see 
infra Part III.A.2. 
 81. See Perez-Velasquez, 2009 WL 1851017, at *1 (noting that certain evidence could 
“support a court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that the best interests of the 
children will be served by termination” (quoting Ferguson v. Stafford Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 
417 S.E.2d 1, 5 (Va. App. 1992))). 
 82. See, e.g., Fairfax Cnty. Dep’t of Family Servs. v. Ibrahim, No. 0821-00-4, 2000 WL 
1847638, at *2 (Va. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2000) (reciting the statutory requirement that unfitness 
must be established by clear and convincing evidence); see also VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-
283(C)(1)–(2) (requiring clear and convincing evidence to establish unfitness). Tellingly, these 
code sections were the basis for termination of Perez-Velasquez’s parental rights, but the court 
declined to quote the language requiring clear and convincing evidence to establish unfitness 
through abuse, neglect, or failure to remedy, choosing only to quote the additional statutory 
requirement that the child’s best interests also be demonstrated by clear and convincing 
evidence. Perez-Velasquez, 2009 WL 1851017, at *2. 
 83. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747–58 (1982). 
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requirements of the statutes in question. In each of the three primary 
areas of findings of unfitness, courts have deviated from the statutory 
language in making findings of unfitness. 
a. Abandonment.  Finding parental unfitness based on 
abandonment of the child generally requires a finding either of 
willfulness or circumstances within the parent’s control.84 In at least 
two cases, courts have ignored or brushed aside that requirement 
despite clear evidence suggesting that the failure to contact or support 
the child was neither willful nor desired by the parent. This treatment 
is out of step with the requirements of the fitness inquiry, as it does 
not sufficiently assess fitness under the relevant state statute. 
Ms. Bail’s case is a good example. When her son’s foster parents 
petitioned the court for the termination of Ms. Bail’s parental rights 
and the right to adopt her son Carlos, Ms. Bail protested.85 She wrote 
a letter to the foster parents’ attorney stating that she did not want 
the adoption to occur and requesting visitation with her son.86 
Despite Ms. Bail’s pleas, Judge David Dally granted both the 
petition to terminate her parental rights and the adoption petition.87 
The termination of Ms. Bail’s parental rights was ostensibly based on 
her abandonment of Carlos by failing to contact him or send financial 
support while she was incarcerated,88 but serious questions remain as 
to whether Ms. Bail in fact failed in this way. The abandonment 
statutes under which she was found to be unfit required a showing of 
willful abandonment or of ability to communicate and failure to do 
so.89 Ms. Bail claims that she went to court six times during her 
 
 84. See supra notes 63–65 and accompanying text. 
 85. S.M. v. E.M.B.R. (In re Adoption of C.M.B.R.), No. SC91141, slip op. at 12–13 (Mo. 
Jan. 25, 2011) (Stith, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), available at http://www.courts.
mo.gov/file.jsp?id=43941. 
 86. Id., slip op. at 6 (majority opinion). 
 87. Id., slip op. at 9. 
 88. Id., slip op. at 32–34; see also MO. ANN. STAT. § 211.447(5)(1)(b) (West Supp. 2010) 
(authorizing termination of parental rights if a child is abandoned, defined in part as the parent 
having “left the child without any provision for parental support and without making 
arrangements to visit or communicate with the child, although able to do so”); Thompson, supra 
note 2 (“[T]he judge found that she had made no attempt to contact the baby or send financial 
support for him . . . .”). 
 89. The trial court found that Ms. Bail abandoned her son under Missouri Statutes 
§§ 453.040(7), 211.447(2)(2)(b). S.M., slip op. at 9. Section 453.040(7) requires “willful[] 
abandon[ment]” or “willful[], substantial[] and continuous[] neglect[].” MO. ANN. STAT. 
§ 453.040(7) (West Supp. 2010). Likewise, section 211.447(2)(2)(b) allows a court to determine 
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incarceration and requested help finding her son each time; no help 
was provided.90 It appears that Ms. Bail had no way of knowing where 
her son was or where she could contact him.91 After receiving 
notification of the adoption petition only in English, she found a 
cellmate to translate for her and immediately wrote to the court 
requesting visitation with her son.92 Essentially “no effort was made to 
locate [Ms. Bail] or to ensure she had knowledge of the termination 
and adoption proceeding.”93 In the meantime, she was transferred to a 
prison in West Virginia, far from the proceedings that were ensuing to 
terminate her parental rights.94 
Mr. Perez-Velasquez’s parental rights were also terminated 
based in part on abandonment, though it is not clear that he met the 
statutory requirements of abandonment. The statute under which he 
was found to have abandoned his children required a lack of good 
cause for failing to maintain contact with his children.95 He had not 
been told where his children were, however, so he could not contact 
them. The court’s response was that the father’s deportation was to 
blame for the lack of communication, so he was responsible for failing 
to maintain contact, proving him unfit.96 The court, however, provided 
no basis in either statutes or case law for its conclusion. 
The statute further required that the failure to communicate be 
in spite of “reasonable and appropriate efforts of . . . rehabilitative 
 
that a parent has abandoned her child if she has “without good cause, left the child without any 
provision for parental support and without making arrangements to visit or communicate with 
the child, although able to do so.” MO. ANN. STAT. § 211.447(2)(2)(b), .447(5)(1)(b) (emphasis 
added). 
 90. Thompson, supra note 2; see also S.M. v. E.M.B.R. (In re Adoption of C.M.B.R.), No. 
SD 30342, 2010 WL 2841486, at *3 (Mo. Ct. App. July 21, 2010) (“No evidence was presented at 
trial to show whether Mother . . . was capable of providing support for Child while she was 
imprisoned. Additionally, nothing in the record indicates that Mother knew how to contact 
Child or where to find him . . . .”). 
 91. S.M., slip op. at 12 (Stith, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]here is no 
evidence that the mother had the opportunity to contact her family to inquire about her 
son. . . . [A]ny lack of evidence demonstrating the mother’s efforts to contact her son does not 
prove that she in fact did not undertake such efforts. It is simply a gap in the record that reflects 
nothing more than the fact that the adoptive parents introduced no evidence tending to disprove 
the allegations in their own petition.”) 
 92. See id., slip op. at 13 (describing the letter requesting visitation). 
 93. S.M., 2010 WL 2841486, at *3. 
 94. Thompson, supra note 2. 
 95. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-283(C)(1) (2010). 
 96. Perez-Velasquez v. Culpeper Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., No. 0360-09-4, 2009 WL 
1851017, at *2 (Va. Ct. App. June 30, 2009). 
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agencies to communicate with the parent or parents and to strengthen 
the parent-child relationship.”97 Mr. Perez-Velasquez argued that he 
was provided no such services to help him maintain contact with his 
children,98 but the court, in contravention of the language of the 
statute, found that it would have been unreasonable to expect such 
services to be provided.99 The court’s only basis for this finding was a 
statement in a case holding, in different factual circumstances, that 
the state was not required to provide services to help a parent regain 
custody while he was in prison.100 In the case relied upon by the court, 
the incarcerated father had, in fact, been provided 
“communicat[ion] . . . as to his daughter’s placement situation,”101 
giving him the information necessary to find and contact his child, 
even from prison. 
b. Failure to Remedy the Condition Leading to Removal.  Mr. 
Perez-Velaquez’s case also demonstrates another problem: when 
unfitness is based on the failure to remedy the condition that led to 
removal, courts often fail to properly apply the fitness inquiry. The 
court appeared to view his deportation as removing all chance of 
future communication with his children, quoting with approval the 
trial court’s statement that “his subsequent deportation eliminated 
any chance that . . . he could participate in remedying, within a 
reasonable time, the conditions resulting in the placement and 
continuation of the children in foster care.”102 Like the abandonment 
statute, the statute basing unfitness on a failure to “remedy 
substantially the conditions which led to . . . the child’s foster care 
 
 97. VA. CODE. ANN. § 16.1-283(C)(1). 
 98. Perez-Velasquez, 2009 WL 1851017, at *2. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See id. (adopting the rationale of Harrison v. Tazewell County Department of Social 
Services, 590 S.E.2d 575 (Va. Ct. App. 2004)). Harrison is distinguishable from Perez-Velasquez 
on two grounds. First, Mr. Perez-Velasquez was denied services even after he left prison, 
whereas Mr. Harrison was denied services only during his incarceration. See Harrison, 590 
S.E.2d at 583 (describing how Mr. Harrison was offered resources before his incarceration and 
remained advised of his child’s placement while incarcerated). Additionally, Mr. Harrison had 
previously refused the services offered to him to better his relationship with his child. Id. 
(“[T]he record reflects that the Department in fact offered Harrison services before he became 
incarcerated and before L.H. was placed in foster care. However, Harrison refused to take 
advantage of those services.”). No evidence that Mr. Perez-Velasquez had previously refused 
services was presented. 
 101. Harrison, 590 S.E.2d at 583. 
 102. Perez-Velasquez, 2009 WL 1851017, at *2 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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placement” required that the Department of Social Services provide 
him services to that end.103 In determining that it would have been 
unreasonable to require the Department to provide such services, the 
court relied on a case that arose in circumstance different from Perez-
Velasquez.104 Because he would have been able to benefit from the 
services, Mr. Perez-Velasquez should have been granted them under 
the statute before being determined unfit. 
Similarly, in 2005, the Tennessee Court of Appeals upheld the 
termination of the parental rights of an illegal Nigerian immigrant on 
the ground that she had failed to remedy the persistent condition that 
required her children to enter foster care.105 Binta Ahmad was 
arrested for theft charges and was unable to make bond, so she 
 
 103. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-283(C)(2) (2010). Notably, Perez-Velasquez calls into question 
a positive result in a previous Virginia Court of Appeals case. In 2000, the court affirmed the 
denial of Virginia’s petition to terminate the parental rights of Usman Ibrahim, a Ghanaian 
national whose three children were placed in foster care after he was arrested. Fairfax Cnty. 
Dep’t of Family Servs. v. Ibrahim, No. 0821-00-4, 2000 WL 1847638, at *1 (Va. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 
2000). After Mr. Ibrahim’s deportation, the Commonwealth of Virginia initiated proceedings to 
terminate his parental rights. Id. The trial court refused to rule that deportation alone was 
sufficient to terminate Mr. Ibrahim’s parental rights and required the state to show that there 
was some statutory basis for terminating his parental rights. Id. at *2. The state, however, failed 
to do so because the conditions that led to the children entering foster care had been corrected 
and because Mr. Ibrahim had not abandoned his children given that he attempted to maintain 
contact with them but was thwarted by both the children’s foster parents and the Department of 
Family Services. Id. at *2–3 (discussing how Mr. Ibrahim’s attempts to maintain contact with his 
children via phone were ruined when the foster parents changed their phone number, and 
explaining the numerous failures of the Department of Family Services to keep in contact with 
Mr. Ibrahim and to provide him services). On appeal in Ibrahim, the Court of Appeals affirmed, 
holding that the “framework for terminating parental rights . . . ‘provides detailed procedures 
designed to protect the rights of the parents and their child[ren] . . . . [and] must be strictly 
followed.’” Id. at *4 (first alteration in original) (quoting Rader v. Montgomery Cnty. Dep’t of 
Soc. Servs., 365 S.E.2d 234, 235–36 (Va. Ct. App. 1988)). In Perez-Velasquez, of course, under 
similar facts, the Virginia Court of Appeals found that the Department of Social Services had no 
responsibility to help an illegal immigrant father maintain contact with his children while they 
were in foster care and consequently upheld the termination of his parental rights. Perez-
Velasquez, 2009 WL 1851017, at *2–3. 
 104. See supra note 100. As noted, Mr. Harrison was denied services while in prison, where 
he would not have been able to take advantage of them. Mr. Perez-Velasquez, by contrast, was 
denied services even after he was deported, when he would have been able to regain custody of 
his children. See State v. Maria L. (In re Interest of Angelica L.), 767 N.W.2d 74, 96 (Neb. 2009) 
(noting that Ms. Luis would be able to regain custody of her children after deportation). 
 105. State Dep’t of Children’s Servs. v. Ahmad, No. M2004-02604-COA-R3-PT, 2005 WL 
975339, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2005); see also TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-113(g)(1), 
(3)(A) (2010) (authorizing termination when there is “[a]bandonment by the parent” and when 
the child has been removed from the parent’s custody and “[t]he conditions that led to the 
child’s removal . . . still persist”). 
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remained incarcerated for over a year.106 Subsequently, she was 
turned over to immigration officials, who detained her for an 
additional two years before deporting her to Nigeria.107 During the 
course of her incarceration, her children had primarily resided in 
foster care;108 when she was deported, she felt it was in the best 
interests of her children to leave them in foster care until she could 
“relocate to a safe country and reclaim [them].”109 In spite of her plan 
to reclaim her children, her parental rights were terminated.110 
In upholding the termination of Ms. Ahmad’s parental rights, the 
Tennessee Court of Appeals found that she “ha[d] been unable to 
remedy the conditions which led to the removal of her children.”111 
The condition that led to the removal of her children was her 
incarceration.112 The statute under which her purported unfitness was 
determined stated that parental rights could be terminated if “[t]he 
conditions that led to the child’s removal . . . still persist.”113 Although 
she was no longer incarcerated at the time of the hearing,114 the court 
found that she nonetheless failed to remedy the condition that led to 
the removal of her children.115 In finding Ms. Ahmad to be unfit, the 
court avoided the clear language of the statue. 
c. Failure to Comply with the Reunification Plan.  In finding that 
parental rights should be terminated based on a failure to comply 
with a reunification plan, courts have ignored the statutory 
requirement that the state provide assistance in the completion of 
that plan. For example, in 2007, the Nebraska Juvenile Court 
 
 106. Ahmad, 2005 WL 975339, at *1. 
 107. Id. 
 108. See id. at *1 n.3. 
 109. Id. at *2 & n.4. 
 110. Id. at *4. 
 111. Id. at *2. 
 112. Id. at *1 n.3. 
 113. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-113(g)(3)(A) (2010). 
 114. Ahmad, 2005 WL 975339, at *1. 
 115. Id. at *2. Courts have dealt differently with this issue, though the approach that appears 
most logically consistent is found in Fairfax County Department of Family Services v. Ibrahim. 
Compare Ahmad, 2005 WL 975339, at *1 (terminating custody of a mother because she “has 
been unable to remedy the conditions which led to the removal of her children” when those 
conditions were her continued incarceration), with Fairfax Cnty. Dep’t of Family Servs. v. 
Ibrahim, No. 0821-00-4, 2000 WL 1847638, at *2 (Va. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2000) (“The trial court 
found the conditions that brought the children into foster care had been substantially corrected 
because . . . the father was no longer incarcerated.”). 
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terminated the parental rights of a Guatemalan illegal immigrant 
after she was put into deportation proceedings.116 In 1998, Maria Luis 
first immigrated to the United States, where she gave birth to her son, 
Daniel.117 She again illegally entered the country in 2004.118 Around 
the time of her second immigration, she gave birth to her daughter, 
Angelica.119 She was arrested in 2005 for “obstructing a government 
operation” and was subsequently turned over to ICE custody.120 
When she was deported in 2005, the state refused to return her 
children to her.121 The state subsequently developed a case plan that 
Ms. Luis was required to complete before regaining custody.122 
Because of a lack of services in Guatemala and the failure of her case 
manager to adequately monitor her progress, Ms. Luis failed to 
“strictly comply with the case plan.”123 This, combined with the fact 
that the children had remained in foster care for fifteen of the 
previous twenty-two months, led the lower court to terminate her 
parental rights.124 The court “questioned whether parental unfitness 
needed to be established in this case in order to terminate parental 
rights, but it concluded that, regardless,” “the State had met its 
 
 116. State v. Maria L. (In re Interest of Angelica L.), 767 N.W.2d 74, 88 (Neb. 2009). 
 117. Id. at 80. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. Angelica’s citizenship status is unclear because it is unknown whether she was born 
in the United States or in Guatemala, during a period in which Ms. Luis briefly returned to that 
country. Id. 
 120. Id. at 82. Ms. Luis’s “obstructi[on of] a government operation” entailed misidentifying 
herself as Angelica’s babysitter to a Department of Health and Human Services social worker 
and a police officer who came to her home to investigate allegations of abuse. Id. at 81–82. She 
misidentified herself in such a fashion because “she was afraid she would lose her children and 
be deported” if she gave her real name. Id. at 81. 
 121. Id. at 82. 
 122. Id. at 83; see also NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-1312 (LexisNexis Supp. 2010) (requiring 
the state to create a permanency plan for the child after she is placed in foster care, with an 
apparent preference for family reunification). 
 123. Maria L., 767 N.W.2d at 84. The plan required Ms. Luis to maintain a job and 
appropriate residence, complete a psychological exam, maintain contact with the case manager 
and children, and take a parenting class. Ms. Luis failed to comply because she was unable to 
obtain parenting classes and a psychological exam in Guatemala. Id. at 83. 
 124. Id. at 84; see also id. at 83 (“The court instructed Maria’s counsel to advise her that 
failure to comply with the case plan, combined with the children’s being out of the home for 15 
or more of the most recent 22 months, would trigger a motion to terminate parental rights.”); 
supra Part II.A. 
HALL IN PRINTER PROOF.DOC 2/10/2011  10:16:50 PM 
2011] PARENTAL RIGHTS TERMINATION 1481 
 
burden of proof and that termination was in the children’s best 
interests.”125 
On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court recognized the lower 
court’s failure to follow established law for finding unfitness and thus 
overturned the termination.126 With regard to the failure to complete 
the reunification plan, the court explained that the goals of the plan 
must be reasonable and that the state must assist the parent in 
complying with the plan.127 The court found that the requirements 
with which Ms. Luis had not complied were “not necessary for [her] 
to become a fit parent” and that the state had provided insufficient 
help to her in complying with the plan.128 Consequently, the statutory 
grounds for a finding of unfitness had not been met.129 In dismissing 
the other basis for the termination, the court stated that to terminate 
parental rights, the state must first prove parental unfitness based on 
a statutory reason and asserted that placement of a child in foster care 
for fifteen of the previous twenty-two months was in itself insufficient 
to establish unfitness.130 
These cases demonstrate situations in which parental rights were 
terminated without clear and convincing evidence of parental 
unfitness or with an unconvincing application of the statutory 
standard for finding unfitness. The next Sections will discuss the two 
underlying issues that appear to have caused the problem. 
B.  Cultural Difference as Unfitness 
Cultural bias, as used here, means expressing a preference for 
one’s own culture and cultural practices over those of another.131 
Cultural bias in family law cases that involve immigration generally 
 
 125. Maria L., 767 N.W.2d at 87. 
 126. Id. at 92. 
 127. Id. at 95. 
 128. Id. at 95–96. 
 129. Id. at 96. 
 130. Id. at 92. 
 131. Cultural bias is displayed frequently in discourse over immigration in the United States, 
such as the statement made by the attorney for Carlos’s adoptive parents in the Bail case that 
“[the U.S. courts] afforded [Bail] more due process than most people get who speak English.” 
Thompson, supra note 2; see also Tim Padgett & Dolly Mascareñas, Did a Mother Lose Her 
Child Because She Doesn’t Speak English?, TIME (Aug. 27, 2009), http://www.time.com/time/
nation/article/0,8599,1918941,00.html (discussing a recent case in which a Mexican mother was 
found unfit by the Mississippi Department of Human Services because “her lack of English 
‘placed her unborn child in danger and will place the baby in danger in the future’”). 
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appears in one of two ways. Courts demonstrate this bias by 
expressing the belief that life with American adoptive parents will, 
necessarily, be superior to the life that a child could have with her 
birth parent in the parent’s home country.132 Alternatively, courts 
display cultural bias when addressing the fitness question, failing to 
fully adhere to the statutory language on unfitness and instead 
allowing considerations such as the parent’s immigration status or 
deportation to affect the termination decision.133 
Courts have demonstrated a preference for American parents 
with “comfortable liv[es,] . . . stable home[s], and . . . support from 
their [local] extended family”134 in a number of cases. Some courts 
state it directly; others state it more subtly, by comparing the 
environment that the parent can provide in her country of origin to 
the environment provided by American foster parents.135 For 
example, in terminating Ms. Bail’s parental rights, Judge Dally 
contrasted the “stable home” of the American adoptive parents with 
the “only certaint[y]” in Ms. Bail’s future, which was that she would 
“remain incarcerated . . . and . . . be deported.”136 Similarly, the 
Nebraska Juvenile Court, in terminating Ms. Luis’s parental rights, 
 
 132. See Yablon-Zug, supra note 4, at 16 (noting that the definition of a good parent is 
“defined in relation to dominant cultural norms”). This focuses on what the court believes to be 
the child’s best interests and, by failing to apply the clear and convincing standard at all or by 
applying it weakly, passes over the imperative first question of whether the parent was unfit. 
Some judges have explicitly expressed their desire to approach the termination inquiry in this 
fashion. Fairfax Cnty. Dep’t of Family Servs. v. Ibrahim, No. 0821-00-4, 2000 WL 1847638, at *5 
(Va. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2000) (Clements, J., concurring) (“To me, the evidence before us is clear 
and convincing that it is in the best interests of these children that the father’s parental rights be 
terminated. However, in this case we have been required by the statute to elevate the ‘technical 
legal rights of the parent’ over the paramount consideration—the best interests of the children.” 
(quoting Forbes v. Haney, 133 S.E.2d 533, 536 (Va. 1963))). 
 133. See supra Part III.A.2. 
 134. Thompson, supra note 2. 
 135. See infra notes 136–40 and accompanying text. 
 136. Thompson, supra note 2; S.M. v. E.M.B.R. (In re Adoption of C.M.B.R.), No. SC91141, 
slip op. at 2 (Mo. Jan. 25, 2011) (Wolff, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), available at 
http://www.courts.mo.gov/file.jsp?id=43941 (“The law does not allow the government to act on 
an assumption that one family would be better than another, for to do so would be to authorize 
the courts to take away the children of the poor and give them to the rich and to take the 
children of foreign-born parents and give them to native-born American families.”); S.M. v. 
E.M.B.R. (In re Adoption of C.M.B.R.), No. SD 30342, 2010 WL 2841486, at *8 (Mo. Ct. App. 
July 21, 2010) (“While the trial court did not expressly say that Respondents could provide a 
better home in the United States for Child, it did so through its actions because it found for 
Respondents even though it had no knowledge of the type of home Mother could offer to Child 
in Guatemala.”). 
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relied on testimony about the lack of “economic opportunities” and 
the “unfamiliar . . . educational system [and] athletic opportunities 
available in Guatemala.”137 
These comparisons, in themselves, suggest a cultural bias against 
immigrants. They place an emphasis on the “dominant cultural 
norms” in American society that define a good parent.138 These norms 
include the notion that a “good parent” will be able to provide a large 
home with private space for the child, along with education and 
medical care that meet American standards.139 The suggestion that the 
adoptive parents would be better parents for Carlos because of their 
“comfortable lives” may reflect the norm that a good parent is one 
who can provide a private space for her child. Likewise, the 
restatement of testimony indicating that economic and educational 
opportunities might not be as great in Guatemala as in the United 
States may reflect the norm that good parents are those able to 
provide their children with the best educational and economic 
options, as defined by American standards. More directly, scholars 
have noted the increasingly common norm that a good parent is a 
nonimmigrant parent.140 This embodies a view that anything incident 
to status as an undocumented immigrant—including deportation or 
incarceration pending deportation—makes one a bad parent. 
Recognition of this bias suggests that Judge Dally’s comment about 
Ms. Bail’s future may have been laced with unconscious bias, rather 
than fully based in concern over the impact of a temporary separation 
of mother and child. 
The Nebraska Supreme Court recognized this as an unacceptable 
practice that had been used by the juvenile court to terminate Ms. 
Luis’s parental rights. In acknowledging the cultural bias displayed by 
the lower court, the appellate court stated that 
the “best interests” of the child standard does not require simply 
that a determination be made that one environment or set of 
circumstances is superior to another. . . . [U]nless [Ms. Luis] is found 
to be unfit, the fact that the state considers certain adoptive 
 
 137. State v. Maria L. (In re Interest of Angelica L.), 767 N.W.2d 74, 85 (Neb. 2009). 
 138. See Yablon-Zug, supra note 4, at 16. 
 139. Id. at 17. 
 140. See, e.g., id. at 19 (noting that immigrant parents “may also be subject to the 
proliferating negative views of undocumented immigrants” and that “the language, culture, and 
values associated with undocumented immigrants are openly considered undesirable”). 
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parents . . . “better,” or this environment “better,” does not 
overcome the commanding presumption that reuniting the children 
with [their parent] is in their best interests—no matter what country 
[the parent] lives in.141 
Cultural bias also plays a role in each of the three ways that 
courts have established unfitness in these cases—abandonment, 
failure to remedy the condition that caused the child to enter foster 
care, and failure to comply with the reunification plan. When 
abandonment is used to prove unfitness, it is based on the parent’s 
incarceration pending deportation—something for which courts 
blame parents,142 even when the decision to immigrate and risk 
deportation was made for the benefit of the child.143 When courts look 
to failure to remedy as proof of unfitness, they demonstrate cultural 
bias in two ways. First, as with the abandonment basis, the condition 
that caused the child to enter foster care is the parent’s arrest for 
deportation proceedings, something that some courts have considered 
a significant-enough fault to justify inferior treatment vis-à-vis 
entitlements to the services that help to remedy the condition.144 
Second, some courts have expressed the opinion that once deported, 
parents cannot remedy the condition145 because they have forfeited 
their rights to their children by leaving the country.146 
Finally, courts display cultural bias in applying failure to 
complete a reunification plan as a means to establish unfitness. This 
bias is most often based on a belief that once deported, the parent will 
be unable to comply with the reunification plan or on an assessment 
 
 141. Maria L., 767 N.W.2d at 94; see also S.M., 2010 WL 2841486, at *8 (quoting with 
approval the Nebraska Supreme Court’s statement that “the ‘best interests’ of the child 
standard does not require simply that a determination be made that one environment or set of 
circumstances is superior to another”). 
 142. See, e.g., Perez-Velasquez v. Culpeper Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., No. 0360-09-4, 2009 
WL 1851017, at *2 (Va. Ct. App. June 30, 2009) (“[F]ather’s own actions led to this 
situation. . . . [H]is incarceration and deportation affected his ability to contact his children and 
participate in the foster care proceedings.”). 
 143. See infra note 153 and accompanying text. 
 144. See Perez-Velasquez, 2009 WL 1851017, at *2 (finding that it would be “unreasonable” 
to provide someone who had been incarcerated and taken into deportation proceedings services 
that would enable him to reunite with his child). 
 145. See, e.g., id. at *2 (“His . . . subsequent deportation eliminated any chance that he could 
maintain contact with the children . . . .” (quoting the trial court opinion)). 
 146. But see supra note 43, discussing a fit illegal immigrant parent’s right to take her U.S. 
citizen child with her upon deportation. 
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of plan completion that does not recognize the variation in services 
available in other countries.147 In determining that parental rights 
should be terminated because of failure to complete a reunification 
plan, one court has found that the parent failed to strictly comply with 
the plan,148 despite evidence that compliance was sufficient given the 
circumstances.149 
In addition to importing cultural bias into analysis of existing 
statutory bases for unfitness, cultural bias against immigrants allows 
courts to find unfitness based on a parent’s illegal entry into the 
United States or on the parent’s status as an undocumented 
immigrant. In terminating Ms. Bail’s parental rights, for example, 
Judge Dally condemned Ms. Bail’s choice to come to the United 
States, writing that her “lifestyle, that of smuggling herself into a 
country illegally . . . is not a lifestyle . . . for a child.”150 Similarly, in 
upholding the termination of Ms. Ahmad’s parental rights, the Court 
of Appeals of Tennessee blamed her choice to come to the United 
States for the termination of her rights, noting that, “[p]erhaps 
termination of [Ms. Ahmad’s] parental rights would not have been 
necessary had [she] not migrated illegally to the United States.”151 In 
terminating Ms. Luis’s parental rights, the Nebraska Juvenile Court 
cited her “unauthorized trip to the United States with a newborn 
premature infant or . . . g[iving] birth to a premature infant in the 
United States” and “[b]eing in the status of an undocumented 
immigrant” as examples of her failures as a parent.152 Likewise, Mr. 
Perez-Velasquez’s “own actions” were found to have “led to” the 
termination of his parental rights because “his incarceration and 
deportation affected his ability to contact his children.”153 
 
 147. See supra notes 13, 123 and accompanying text. 
 148. See supra notes 122–23 and accompanying text. 
 149. See supra notes 127–29 and accompanying text. 
 150. S.M. v. E.M.B.R. (In re Adoption of C.M.B.R.), No. SD 30342, 2010 WL 2841486, at *4 
(Mo. Ct. App. July 21, 2010). 
 151. State Dep’t of Children’s Servs. v. Ahmad, No. M2004-02604-COA-R3-PT, 2005 WL 
975339, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2005). 
 152. State v. Maria L. (In re Interest of Angelica L.), 767 N.W.2d 74, 88 (Neb. 2009). 
 153. Perez-Velasquez, 2009 WL 1851017, at *2. Despite what some might perceive as a valid 
position—that immigrating to and living in the United States illegally is a poor situation in 
which to raise a child—that view has been challenged by courts, academics, and non-profits. The 
Nebraska Supreme Court, for example, recognized that illegally entering the United States and 
having the status of an undocumented immigrant was an insufficient reason—one based on 
cultural bias—for terminating parental rights. In overturning Ms. Luis’s termination, the court 
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These cases suggest that cultural bias affects courts’ termination 
decisions. The Supreme Court has warned that such cultural biases 
may improperly affect termination-of-parental-rights proceedings.154 It 
is up to state courts to heed this warning and follow the law fairly. At 
least two courts have been successful, though not without having to 
chastise lower courts for their willingness to allow a “culture clash”155 
to dictate the outcome of their decisions.156 Although these courts can 
serve as a model for other courts, other measures will be necessary to 
address the second problematic factor in these cases—the 
incarceration of the parents. 
C.  The Prisoner’s Dilemma 
The realities of prison life present special challenges for parents 
facing termination of their parental rights, often exacerbated for 
illegal immigrants who are in prison pending deportation 
proceedings. The most important of these challenges are barriers to 
communication and the use of parental incarceration as a ground for 
 
refused to “conclude that [Ms. Luis’s] attempt to bring herself and her child into the United 
States, in the belief that they would have a better life here, shows an appreciable absence of 
care, concern, or judgment.” Maria L., 767 N.W.2d at 93. Professor David Thronson has 
similarly labeled judges as culturally biased when, for example, a judge terminated a father’s 
parental rights based on the father’s failure to gain legal status in the United States and on his 
likelihood of deportation. David B. Thronson, Of Borders and Best Interests: Examining the 
Experiences of Undocumented Immigrants in U.S. Family Courts, 11 TEX. HISP. J.L. & POL’Y 45, 
54 (2005). A 2010 report from First Focus and the Migration and Child Welfare National 
Network noted that “biased family court judges may inappropriately base their decision[s] 
on . . . parent[s’] immigration status rather than their demonstrated parenting capacity.” Wendy 
Cervantes & Yali Lincroft, The Impact of Immigration Enforcement on Child Welfare, CAUGHT 
BETWEEN SYS. (First Focus & Migration & Child Welfare Nat’l Network, Wash., D.C.), 
Mar. 2010, at 1, 4–5, available at http://www.firstfocus.net/sites/default/files/CaughtBetween
Systems.pdf. 
 154. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 763 (1982) (“Because parents subject to 
termination proceedings are often poor, uneducated, or members of minority groups, such 
proceedings are often vulnerable to judgments based on cultural or class bias.” (citation 
omitted)). 
 155. Maria L., 767 N.W.2d at 93 (“What we are dealing with here is a culture clash.”). 
 156. See S.M. v. E.M.B.R. (In re Adoption of C.M.B.R.), No. SD 30342, 2010 WL 2841486, 
at *7 (Mo. Ct. App. July 21, 2010) (“If Mother’s immigration status was considered as a factor, 
we note that immigration status has never been one of the factors to consider when determining 
whether to terminate parental rights. . . . While the trial court did not expressly say that 
Respondents could provide a better home in the United States for Child, it did so through its 
actions because it found for Respondents even though it had no knowledge of the type of home 
Mother could offer to Child in Guatemala.”); Maria L., 767 N.W.2d at 94 (“[W]hether living in 
Guatemala or the United States is more comfortable for the children is not determinative of the 
children’s best interests.”). 
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termination of parental rights because of the length of incarceration 
or the fact of incarceration itself. 
Illegal immigrants can arrive in prison in one of two ways. First, 
they may be arrested strictly for immigration violations, resulting in 
their detention in an ICE facility.157 Second, they may be arrested for 
a crime by local, state, or federal law enforcement officials.158 After 
the arrest, they can be sentenced for the crime through the state or 
federal court system and then will generally be held in state or federal 
prison for the duration of their sentence before being transferred into 
ICE custody.159 If the crime is an immigration crime for which an 
arrest is made at the local or state level, the arresting officer must 
contact federal authorities and transfer the immigrant to ICE 
custody.160 Alternatively, the criminal charges may be dropped, at 
which time the immigrant would most likely be transferred to ICE 
custody for deportation proceedings.161 
When an illegal immigrant is arrested by state or local 
authorities, a provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(INA)162 allows those officials to carry out the functions of 
immigration officials, provided the officials meet certain 
requirements.163 Section 287(g) of the INA allows state and local 
 
 157. See Fact Sheet: Detention Management, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS 
ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/detention-mgmt.htm (last visited 
Feb. 8, 2011) (noting that, as of November 20, 2008, “ICE . . . uses more than 300 local and state 
facilities operating under intergovernmental service agreements; seven contract detention 
facilities and eight ICE-owned facilities” to hold detainees). 
 158. See Solomon Moore, Study Shows Sharp Rise in Latino Federal Convicts, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 19, 2009, at A14 (discussing the transfer of illegal immigrants into ICE custody after they 
have served their federal criminal sentences); Jennifer Steinhauer, Arizona Prisons Plan to 
Transfer Illegal Immigrants to Federal Custody, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2009, at A23 (discussing 
the transfer of illegal immigrants convicted of state crimes to federal custody). 
 159. See Moore, supra note 158 (“Federal prisoners who are illegal immigrants are usually 
deported to their home countries after serving their sentences.”). 
 160. Kris W. Kobach, State and Local Authority to Enforce Immigration Law: A Unified 
Approach for Stopping Terrorists, BACKGROUNDER (Ctr. for Immigration Studies, Wash., 
D.C.), June 2004, at 1, available at http://www.cis.org/articles/2004/back604.pdf. 
 161. See, e.g., Maria L., 767 N.W.2d at 82 (“Shortly after her arrest. [sic] [for criminal 
charges] Maria was taken into custody by . . . [ICE]. The original [criminal] charges . . . were not 
pursued.”). 
 162. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) 
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1537 (2006)). 
 163. INA § 287(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g); see also Fact Sheet: Delegation of Immigration 
Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and Nationality Act, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS 
ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/287g.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2011) 
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officials who have been trained by ICE to detain illegal immigrants 
and charge them for immigration violations, which begins the removal 
process.164 They may do so after arresting an immigrant for federal 
immigration violations or after arresting the immigrant for other 
criminal charges and subsequently identifying her as an illegal alien.165 
This contributes to the number of illegal immigrants being held in 
state and local prisons and jails.166 
1. Barriers to Communication.  Incarcerated parents face a 
number of hurdles when attempting to communicate with their 
children. These difficulties are present in state and federal prisons, 
where illegal immigrants are often held,167 and it is reasonable to 
assume that they also exist at ICE facilities.168 
Telephone is one of the primary methods of communication for 
incarcerated parents and their children. Because prisons use 
expensive collect calling systems that require the receiving party to 
pay costly charges,169 however, this form of communication may be 
 
(describing the § 287(g) program and listing requirements for participation). 
 164. See INA § 287(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (“[T]he Attorney General may enter into a 
written agreement . . . pursuant to which an officer or employee of the State or subdivision, who 
is determined by the Attorney General to be qualified to perform a function of an immigration 
officer in relation to the investigation, apprehension, or detention of aliens in the United 
States . . . may carry out such function . . . .”); see also Jessica M. Vaughan & James R. Edwards, 
Jr., The 287(g) Program: Protecting Home Towns and Homeland, BACKGROUNDER (Ctr. for 
Immigration Studies, Wash., D.C.), Oct. 2009, at 3, available at http://www.cis.org/articles/2009/
287g.pdf (“Memoranda of agreement . . . enable local police to assist federal authorities in the 
investigation, arrest, detention, and transportation of illegal aliens . . . .”); id. at 3 (“While state 
and local officers have inherent legal authority to make immigration arrests, 287(g) provides 
additional enforcement authority to the selected officers such as the ability to charge illegal 
aliens with immigration violations, beginning the process of removal.”). 
 165. See Vaughan & Edwards, supra note 164, at 3 (“[S]tate and local officers have inherent 
legal authority to make immigration arrests.”); id. at 6 (“Having jail intake officers identify 
illegal aliens at the time of booking [for non-immigration crimes] ensures that they will be 
flagged for removal before release.”). 
 166. See Fact Sheet: Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and 
Nationality Act, supra note 163 (“Since January 2006, the 287(g) program is credited with 
identifying more than 185,000 potentially removable aliens—mostly at local jails.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 167. See supra Notes 156–65. 
 168. This is a reasonable assumption both because ICE facilities, by their limited nature, are 
often farther from the immigrant’s home and because ICE facilities are federal facilities, 
suggesting that federal statistics provided herein are relevant to ICE facilities. 
 169. See TRAVIS ET AL., supra note 53, at 6 (discussing the high costs of collect calls in 
prisons). 
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unavailable to incarcerated parents if the child’s caregiver is unable or 
unwilling to accept the charges.170 Furthermore, foster parents may be 
unwilling to allow communication via telephone at all and may refuse 
to accept collect call charges or provide the correct phone number to 
the biological parent.171 Finally, correction facility policies often limit 
the number of calls a prisoner is allowed to receive.172 
Whatever the reason, in 2004, 15 percent of parents incarcerated 
in federal prisons had never spoken with their children via 
telephone.173 Nearly another 30 percent of parents spoke to their 
children via telephone only monthly or less frequently.174 In state 
prisons, the numbers were worse: 47 percent of parents had never 
contacted their children via telephone.175 Given that “[t]he probability 
of termination increases as a result of . . . limited contact [between] 
incarcerated parents . . . [and] their children,”176 this communication 
barrier represents a significant problem for incarcerated parents who 
want to maintain custody of their children. 
As difficult as telephone communication is, problems arranging 
face-to-face visitation for incarcerated parents are even greater. 
Foster parents may be reluctant to arrange, participate in, or 
 
 170. Laughlin et al., supra note 50, at 222. 
 171. Because foster parents are not required to help maintain contact of any sort, it is 
possible that problems of foster parents withholding communication are prevalent in this area. 
See id. (“When children of incarcerated [parents] are placed in foster homes, foster parents are 
under no obligation to facilitate visits or any other type of contact between the child and the 
[parent] . . . .”); see also State v. Maria L. (In re Interest of Angelica L.), 767 N.W.2d 74, 83 
(Neb. 2009) (“Although [the immigrant mother] wanted to initiate telephone calls with her 
children [in foster care], she was not provided with a telephone number to contact the children 
and any contact with the children had to be initiated by their foster parents.”); Fairfax Cnty. 
Dep’t of Family Servs. v. Ibrahim, No. 0821-00-4, 2000 WL 1847638, at *2 (Va. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 
2000) (noting that communication between an incarcerated illegal immigrant parent and his 
children was terminated because the children’s foster parents changed their phone number). 
 172. See TRAVIS ET AL., supra note 53, at 1 (“The number of calls . . . per prisoner is 
typically limited by corrections policy.”); see also RANDY CAPPS, ROSA MARIA CASTAÑEDA, 
AJAY CHAUDRY & ROBERT SANTOS, PAYING THE PRICE: THE IMPACT OF IMMIGRATION 
RAIDS ON AMERICA’S CHILDREN 2 (2007) (“Detained immigrants had very limited access to 
telephones to communicate with their families . . . .”). 
 173. LAUREN E. GLAZE & LAURA M. MARUSCHAK, PARENTS IN PRISON AND THEIR 
MINOR CHILDREN 18 (Bureau of Justice Statistics, Special Report No. NCJ 222984, 2008), 
available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/pptmc.pdf. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Ellen Barry, River Ginchild & Doreen Lee, Legal Issues for Prisoners with Children, in 
CHILDREN OF INCARCERATED PARENTS 147, 151 (Katherine Gabel & Denise Johnston eds., 
1995). 
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otherwise facilitate in-person visits.177 This reluctance may be 
aggravated by the distances that must often be traveled for a personal 
visit to occur. Prisons are generally located in rural areas, far from the 
urban and suburban areas where the majority of the population 
resides. This is often worse for mothers than for fathers, as there are 
fewer prisons for women, which results in incarcerated mothers being 
held further from their last place of residence.178 In 1997, 84 percent of 
parents incarcerated in federal prisons were housed more than one 
hundred miles from their last place of residence, often the place of 
residence they shared with their child prior to incarceration.179 Forty-
three percent of parents in federal prisons were held more than five 
hundred miles from their last place of residence.180 The picture is 
slightly better for parents incarcerated in state prisons, though over 
half of those parents were held in a prison more than one hundred 
miles from their homes.181 Recent reports suggest that this trend 
continues today.182 In 2004, these often-insurmountable difficulties 
resulted in 45 percent of federally incarcerated parents never having a 
personal visit with their child and another 36 percent having personal 
visits less than once a month through the duration of their 
incarceration.183 Additionally, nearly 60 percent of parents 
incarcerated in state prisons had never been personally visited by 
their children.184 
 
 177. See TRAVIS ET AL., supra note 53, at 5 (listing “[f]oster parents . . . who are unwilling to 
facilitate visits” as an “obstacle[] to parent-child visits in prison”); see also supra note 171. 
 178. Laughlin et al., supra note 50, at 222. 
 179. CHRISTOPHER J. MUMOLA, INCARCERATED PARENTS AND THEIR CHILDREN 5 
(Bureau of Justice Statistics, Special Report No. NCJ 182335, 2000), available at http://bjs.ojp.
usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/iptc.pdf. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. See, e.g., LIS Inc., NAT’L INST. OF CORRECTIONS INFO. CTR., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
SERVICES FOR FAMILIES OF PRISON INMATES 4 (2002) (noting that although some corrections 
agencies use proximity to family as a basis for inmate assignment to a particular location, an 
equal number do not or cannot because of facility limitations); Laughlin et al., supra note 50, at 
222 (discussing geographic distance as a continuing impediment to personal visitation between 
incarcerated parents and their children); Immigrant Detainees Denied Access to Lawyers, THE 
BLOG OF LEGAL TIMES, (Sept. 14, 2010, 4:13 PM), http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2010/09/
thousands-of-people-in-immigration-detention-facilities-are-unable-to-get-lawyers-because-of-
geographically-isolated-facili.html (“The geographic isolation of many of the facilities is 
stark . . . . For example, [one jail] is 346 miles from the nearest city. [Another] facility . . . is 315 
miles from the closest city.”). 
 183. GLAZE & MARUSCHAK, supra note 173, at 18. 
 184. Id. 
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This problem is likely to be even worse for illegal immigrants 
who are held pending deportation because they are “routinely 
transferred to more remote jails” and may be “moved from state to 
state without notice.”185 In at least one case, transfer out of the state 
has been used as a factor in terminating an illegal immigrant parent’s 
rights.186 On the whole, barriers to personal visitation for immigrant 
and nonimmigrant parents alike are immense; the special 
circumstances of immigrant parents only serve to lessen their ability 
to successfully organize a personal visit. 
If a visit is successfully arranged, the problems have not ceased 
for the incarcerated parent. Poor visiting conditions are rampant 
because of prison procedures that restrict visitation for security 
reasons, subject visitors to embarrassing searches,187 and create 
conditions that are inhospitable to children.188 In the prison setting, a 
“security and safety rationale [often] dominates,”189 leading prisons to 
develop visitation policies in conformity with the “institution’s 
schedule, space and personnel constraint[s],”190 rather than those 
conducive to meaningful visits. These policies often mean that 
children visiting their parents must come at a certain time of day, wait 
long periods of time to be let in for the visit,191 and avoid physical 
contact during the visit, often being required to speak via phone to 
 
 185. Nina Bernstein, Immigrant Jail Tests U.S. View of Legal Access, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 
2009, at A1. This movement generally occurs when an immigrant is being transferred to an 
official ICE facility, located in only a handful of states. See also CAPPS ET AL., supra note 172, at 
2 (noting that “many [detained immigrants] were moved to remote detention facilities out of the 
states in which they were arrested”). 
 186. See State Dep’t of Children’s Servs. v. Ahmad, No. M2004-02604-COA-R3-PT, 2005 
WL 975339, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2005) (finding that termination was proper in part 
because Ms. Ahmad’s children had only been able to visit her twice during the six years of her 
incarceration due to her transfer from a facility in Alabama to one in Louisiana). 
 187. Hairston, supra note 53, at 10. Hairston also notes that visitors are subject to body 
scans. Id.; see also Barry et al., supra note 176, at 151 (“[T]here have been several instances 
where children have been strip-searched or pat-searched by correctional staff who claimed they 
had to do so because of ‘security concerns.’”). 
 188. See, e.g., TRAVIS ET AL., supra note 53, at 5 (listing “obstacles to parent-child visits in 
prison”); Hairston, supra note 53, at 10 (describing the conditions faced by prison visitors, 
particularly child visitors). 
 189. Hairston, supra note 53, at 10. 
 190. Pamela Lewis, Comment, Behind the Glass Wall: Barriers that Incarcerated Parents 
Face Regarding the Care, Custody and Control of Their Children, 19 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. 
LAW. 97, 108 (2004). 
 191. See Hairston, supra note 53, at 10 (discussing how prison visitors must wait for 
visitation times). 
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their parent. Consequently, even when prison visits are granted for 
incarcerated parents, these obstacles may make visits difficult for 
children to attend and even more difficult for the parent and child to 
enjoy in a productive way. 
2. Incarceration as a Demonstration of Unfitness.  The ASFA 
requires that states begin termination proceedings against any parent 
whose child has been in foster care for fifteen out of the previous 
twenty-two months. For many undocumented parents, entering 
deportation proceedings means that the ASFA will inevitably be 
triggered. Once the parent is arrested, the child is likely to be placed 
in foster care,192 and between spending time in jail and being 
deported, the parent is likely to be unable to care for the child for a 
period of fifteen or more months.193 
In addition to the ASFA, at least twelve states have laws that 
base termination of parental rights on the length of a parent’s stay in 
prison, regardless of the type of crime committed by the parent.194 
These statutes make it difficult for any incarcerated parent to 
maintain parental rights and can be quite hard on illegal immigrant 
parents who may be held pending deportation for years. These 
 
 192. See Wendy Cervantes, Protecting the Children of Immigrants, IMMIGR. PROF BLOG 
(May 30, 2010), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/2010/05/protect-the-children-of-
immigrants.html (“Often, detained parents are not able to make child care arrangements, 
resulting in the unnecessary placement of their children in the child welfare system. Once a child 
is placed into foster care, it is extremely difficult for a detained parent to reunify with his or her 
child, especially if that parent is transferred to an out-of-state detention facility or deported 
before regaining custody of his or her child.”). 
 193. See, e.g., State v. Maria L. (In re Interest of Angelica L.), 767 N.W.2d 74, 81–82, 84 
(Neb. 2009) (noting that because Ms. Luis was taken into custody and subsequently deported, 
her children had been in foster care for seventeen months when the petition to terminate her 
parental rights was filed); State Dep’t of Children’s Servs. v. Ahmad, No. M2004-02604-COA-
R3-PT, 2005 WL 975339, at *1–2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2005) (noting that Ms. Ahmad was 
held in prison for over a year on criminal charges and then transferred to immigration custody 
before being deported in December 2002, and that her children had been in foster care since 
September 2000). 
 194. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-2005(1)(e) (2009) (allowing termination of parental 
rights based on incarceration for “a substantial period of time during the child's minority”); LA. 
CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 1015(6) (2004) (allowing termination of parental rights if incarceration 
will prevent the parent from caring for the child for “an extended period of time”); OHIO REV. 
CODE. ANN. § 2151.414(E)(12) (West 2005 & Supp. 2009) (allowing termination of parental 
rights based on incarceration for at least eighteen months); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-8A-
26.1(4) (2004 & Supp. 2010) (allowing the court to find good cause to terminate the parental 
rights of a parent who “[i]s incarcerated and is unavailable to care for the child during a 
significant period of the child’s minority”). 
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statutes range from providing a short, specific number of years of 
incarceration that proves unfitness195 to broader statutes that allow 
incarceration for a “substantial” or “extended” period of time to be a 
ground for finding parental unfitness.196 The short duration of the 
former is difficult for illegal immigrants to avoid given that many of 
them are incarcerated first for the crime that brought them to the 
attention of the criminal justice system and then for a longer period of 
time pending deportation.197 The indefinite language of the latter 
statutes can be especially difficult on illegal immigrants because a 
judge who is culturally biased in favor of American adoptive parents 
will have plenty of leeway to find that the immigrant parent has been 
incarcerated long enough to meet the statutory definition of 
unfitness.198 
Finally, at least ten states have other statutes that could lead to 
the termination of an incarcerated parent’s parental rights. These 
statutes generally allow courts to find that a parent is unfit or to 
refuse to attempt to reunite the parent and child if the parent has 
failed to maintain contact with the child for a period of time.199 Many 
 
 195. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 600.020(2)(b) (West 2006) (providing that a period of 
incarceration of at least one year is an aggravating circumstance and allowing the state to 
dispense with making “[r]easonable efforts” toward reunification if the child has been subjected 
to an aggravating circumstance); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A.19b(3)(h) (West 2002 & 
Supp. 2010) (providing that a period of incarceration in excess of two years combined with a 
failure to provide for the child’s care and custody is grounds for terminating the parent’s rights). 
 196. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1103(a)(5)(a)(3) (2009) (allowing termination of 
parental rights if the parent “is incapable of discharging parental responsibilities due to 
extended . . . incarceration”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.806(1)(d)(1) (West 2003 & Supp. 2010) 
(allowing termination of parental rights when the parent is incarcerated for “a substantial 
portion of the period of time before the child” turns eighteen); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-7(a)(2)(i) 
(2003) (requiring the court to terminate parental rights if the parent is imprisoned for “an 
extended period of time”). 
 197. See, e.g., Ahmad, 2005 WL 975339, at *1 (discussing the case of a mother who was 
arrested for felony theft charges for which she was incarcerated for one year before being 
turned over to immigration officials and imprisoned for another two years before deportation); 
see also supra Notes 156–65. 
 198. In many cases involving the termination of incarcerated immigrants’ parental rights, 
courts focus on the length of time that the immigrant’s child is in foster care. For example, one 
court pointed out that the children had been in foster care for “more than half of each child’s 
life” before terminating an immigrant mother’s parental rights. Ahmad, 2005 WL 975339, at *2. 
 199. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.26(c)(1) (West Supp. 2010) (providing that 
courts do not have to offer reunification services before terminating parental rights if “the 
parent has failed to visit or contact the child for six months”); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
§ 50/1(D) (West 2008) (“The grounds of unfitness [include] . . . (n) [e]vidence of intent to 
forgo . . . parental rights . . . (1) as manifested by . . . failure for a period of 12 months: (i) to visit 
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of these statutes make no exceptions for the parent’s inability to 
maintain contact, which can be a problem for any incarcerated parent 
who is unable to reach her children via telephone or to arrange an in-
person visit.200 These statutes can be particularly perilous for 
incarcerated immigrant parents who often face considerable 
geographic barriers to communication with their children.201 
IV.  APPROACHING A SOLUTION 
As explained in Part I, the state of constitutional law currently 
views the termination of parental rights with a wary eye and affords 
parents protection from termination in the form of procedural 
safeguards designed to prevent undue violations of their rights. In the 
context of illegal immigrants taken into deportation proceedings, 
however, these safeguards are failing. To begin to remedy the 
growing problem of illegal immigrants losing their parental rights 
during incarceration, both contributing factors—cultural bias and 
prison issues—must be addressed. Amendments or additions to state 
and federal law, as well as stricter adherence to an existing 
international treaty, can begin to address these problems to varying 
degrees. The general approach should be a preference for keeping 
families together, indifferent to the ultimate country of residence.202 
This approach is consistent with Supreme Court jurisprudence, which 
 
the child, (ii) to communicate with the child . . . or (iii) to maintain contact with . . . the 
child . . . .”); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 210, § 3(c)(iii) (LexisNexis Supp. 2010) (stating that when a 
child has been placed outside of the home for at least six months, the court may consider in the 
unfitness inquiry a parent’s failure to “maintain[] significant and meaningful contact with the 
child during [those] six months”). Other states with similar statutes include Arkansas, Iowa, 
Michigan, Mississippi, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Washington. See CHILD WELFARE INFO. 
GATEWAY, supra note 61, at 10, 13, 22, 30, 32, 48, 58–59. 
 200. See supra Part III.C.1. 
 201. See supra notes 178–86 and accompanying text. 
 202. Professor Thronson notes that when immigration law attempts to achieve family 
integrity, it is “indifferent to place” and expresses “no preference for a family staying in the 
United States over leaving.” Thronson, supra note 43, at 1185–86. Thronson further notes that 
in considering hardship applications, which allow illegal immigrants to stay in the United States 
upon a showing that their deportation would create an extreme hardship to one of their 
dependents, courts will generally not grant applications that only argue that “children will not 
have the same levels of education, health care and economic opportunities [in their home 
country] that they would have in the United States.” Id. at 1172. 
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expresses a preference for family unity,203 and draws on immigration 
law principles.204  
The road to a solution is not an uncharted one. At the national 
level, legislation was introduced in the 111th Session of Congress to 
work toward keeping immigrant families together, even when parents 
and children are separated because of prison or deportation issues.205 
At the state level, court opinions and statutes exist in a handful of 
states that, if adopted in other states, would resolve many of the bias- 
and prison-related issues.206 Additionally, the United States is party to 
an international agreement that, if followed, would provide relief 
from the effects of cultural bias.207 Widespread adoption and faithful 
implementation of these existing laws collectively represent the path 
to success. If this path is followed, the United States can begin to 
ensure that no matter the other problems with the current 
immigration system, unnecessarily robbing immigrant parents of their 
parental rights will not be one of them. 
A.  Help Family Integrity by HELPing the ASFA 
A serious problem for undocumented immigrant parents is the 
ASFA’s requirement that states initiate termination proceedings 
against any parent whose child has been in foster care for fifteen out 
of the previous twenty-two months. For immigrants who are taken 
into deportation proceedings and forced to leave their children in 
foster care while they are in prison or deported, state compliance with 
the ASFA’s requirements can often result in termination proceedings 
in which many immigrants lack the resources to defend themselves. 
Federal legislation proposed in the last congressional session208 would 
 
 203. See supra Part I. 
 204. See supra note 202. Although authorities on the intersection of family and immigration 
law generally agree that immigration law practices are dangerous to families, this is one area in 
which immigration law’s approach can be beneficial. See, e.g., Bridgette A. Carr, Incorporating a 
“Best Interests of the Child” Approach into Immigration Law and Procedure, 12 YALE HUM. 
RTS. & DEV. L.J. 120, 123 (2009) (arguing that immigration law’s failure to consider the best 
interests of children has a negative effect on families). 
 205. See infra Part IV.A. 
 206. See infra Part IV.B. 
 207. See infra Part IV.C. 
 208. As of the beginning of the 112th Session of Congress, the HELP Separated Children 
Act is off the table for consideration unless reintroduced. H.R.3531—HELP Separated Children 
Act, OPENCONGRESS, http://www.opencongress.org/bill/111-h3531/show (last visited Feb. 8, 
2011); H.R. 3531: HELP Separated Children Act, GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/
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have amended the ASFA to require states to “create and implement 
protocols”209 on dealing with separated children, defined as 
individuals who are legally in the United States, have a parent or legal 
guardian who has been detained for immigration reasons or who has 
been deported, and are in the foster care system.210 Titled the Humane 
Enforcement and Legal Protections (HELP) Separated Children 
Act,211 this Act would, if reintroduced and adopted, require that states 
develop separated-children guidelines that account for the best 
interests of the child and the best outcome for the child’s family.212 
The law would also require that parents and children be provided 
with a case manager or interpreter who speaks their native language 
and that parents who wish to take their children with them during 
deportation be given adequate time to collect all necessary 
documents.213 These requirements would make cultural sensitivity and 
respect for the parental rights of illegal immigrants a part of the law 
by recognizing the barriers that immigrant parents face in custody 
matters and affirming their right to take their citizen children with 
them upon deportation. 
Most importantly, the Act would require states to implement 
protocols that “ensure that . . . decisions [about care, custody, and 
placement of the child] are based on clearly articulated factors that do 
not include predictions or conclusions about immigration status or 
pending Federal immigration proceedings.”214 This requirement would 
effectively shift the focus from the parent’s immigration status to the 
proper inquiry—parental fitness. With proper interpretation and 
execution, this provision could prevent states from ignoring the clear 
and convincing evidentiary standard in the fitness inquiry or from 
avoiding the required language of fitness statutes in favor of an 
inquiry focused on what the parent can provide in her country of 
origin. 
The inclusion of consideration of the best interests of the family 
and the prohibition of the use of immigration status as a factor in the 
 
congress/bill.xpd?bill=h111-3531 (last visited Feb. 8, 2011). 
 209. HELP Separated Children Act, H.R. 3531, 111th Cong. § 6(a)(3)(A) (2009). 
 210. Id. § 6(c). 
 211. HELP Separated Children Act, H.R. 3531, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 212. Id. § 6(a)(3)(B), (E). 
 213. Id. § 6(a)(3)(D), (F). 
 214. Id. § 6(a)(3)(E) (emphasis added); see also supra notes 142, 144–53 and accompanying 
text. 
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placement determination are good beginnings, but to eradicate the 
use of cultural bias by the courts, the Act, if reintroduced, should be 
amended to go further. In its initial formulation, it relied heavily on 
best-interests-of-the-child language,215 which is the same language on 
which some courts have relied to improperly terminate immigrants’ 
parental rights.216 A reintroduced version of the Act should clearly 
define best interests of the child and best interests of the family, 
including in those definitions a presumption that family reunification 
is in the best interests of all parties, absent a showing of parental 
unfitness. An updated version should also specify that the fitness 
inquiry is to be undertaken before the best-interests inquiry, keeping 
with current constitutional law. 
If adopted, the HELP Separated Children Act might also address 
some of the difficulties that prison life poses for retention of parental 
rights. As initially proposed, the Act might have removed some of the 
barriers to communication faced by undocumented parents while in 
prison. For example, the proposed version of the legislation would 
have required that detention facilities holding parents for 
immigration reasons “take steps to preserve family unity and ensure 
the best outcome for families,” in part by ensuring that detained 
parents are given “free and confidential phone calls with their 
children on a daily basis . . . .”217 The adoption of such a law at the 
federal level would make great strides toward ensuring sufficient 
communication between incarcerated immigrant parents and their 
children. 
Additionally, barriers to visitation can be reduced by requiring 
that immigrants with children be held in facilities within a reasonable 
distance of their children, that they not be moved to new facilities 
without notice and before necessary to place them in an ICE facility, 
and that foster parents participate in personal visits.218 The proposed 
version of the HELP Separated Children Act would have begun to 
implement these changes by requiring that detained parents be 
“permitted regular contact visits with their children.”219 The proposed 
 
 215. E.g., H.R. 3531 §§ 3(b)(14), 6(a)(6). 
 216. See supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
 217. H.R. 3531 § 9(a), (c)(1). 
 218. See supra Part III.C.1. 
 219. H.R. 3531 § 9(c)(2). 
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version of the Act would also have mandated that the location of the 
parent be noted in the plan to provide services to the child.220 
The HELP Separated Children Act, however, could be modified 
to more fully address prison barriers to retention of parental rights. 
Since adoption of the Act would require its reintroduction in the new 
session of Congress, there is presently an opportunity for such 
modification. First, although the proposed language would have 
mandated regular contact visits for detained parents, it did not specify 
what type of contact would have been required, and would not have 
explicitly required foster parents to facilitate the contact.221 
Additionally, though the Act would have required that the service 
plan note the parent’s location, it would not have made any 
provisions for keeping that location the same throughout the 
incarceration or notifying the child and the child’s foster parents of 
any changes in that location. To better address the problem of failed 
communication between incarcerated parents and their children, a 
reintroduced version should require that parents be held in facilities 
within a certain distance of their children and that they not be moved 
without notice,222 and it should define the parameters of the foster 
parent’s responsibilities explicitly. 
One final problem relates to the application of the fifteen-out-of-
the-previous-twenty-two-months rule currently in the ASFA. The 
initial version of the HELP Separated Children Act did not 
specifically address how separated children are to be treated with 
regard to this ASFA requirement.223 Though the proposed version 
would have added the definition of “separated child” to the section of 
the ASFA imposing this requirement,224 it would not have given any 
indication whether the fifteen-month requirement would continue to 
apply to separated children. For the Act to work toward eradicating 
 
 220. Id. § 6(b). 
 221. See id. § 9(c)(2) (granting detained parents, guardians, and caregivers “regular contact 
visits with their children”). 
 222. Some states already do this. See Laughlin et al., supra note 50, at 222 (noting that half 
of all prisons try to house inmates in the facilities that are closest to their families). 
Alternatively, children could be placed in foster homes that are close to the facility where their 
parent will be held. See Barry et al., supra note 176, at 154 (“Children who must be placed in 
foster care outside of their families should be placed in homes as near to their parents as 
possible in order to decrease traveling time and distance . . . .”). This works, however, only if 
parents are not frequently transferred to other facilities. 
 223. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E) (2006). 
 224. H.R. 3531 § 6(c). 
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prison-life issues, a reintroduced version should be amended to make 
the fifteen-month termination-proceeding-initiation requirement 
inapplicable to separated children.225 Reintroduced with these 
modifications, this piece of legislation would be a valuable first step in 
ameliorating prison-life issues in custody proceedings for illegal 
immigrants and should therefore be reintroduced and adopted.226 
Adoption of a modified version of the HELP Separated Children 
Act would help prevent cultural bias from driving judicial 
determinations regarding parental rights. Providing parents with 
consistent contact with their children would help address some of the 
prison-life barriers to parental rights—a goal that the modified Act 
could achieve. Changes to state and international law, however, are 
also required. 
B.  State Law Changes 
States should adopt two types of laws to alleviate cultural bias 
and remedy prison-life barriers to the maintenance of parental rights. 
First, states should adopt laws that explicitly assert that initiation of 
deportation proceedings is not a ground for terminating parental 
rights. Such laws would set a statutory threshold of unfitness that rises 
above merely facing deportation proceedings. This would provide 
immigrants with statutory protection from judges who believe that 
immigration status alone bears on a parent’s fitness.227 
This approach is not without precedent. At least one state court 
has recognized that “[parents do] not forfeit [their] parental rights 
because [they are] deported.”228 A model for such an approach is 
 
 225. In its state version of the fifteen-month requirement, New Mexico makes a similar 
exception. It provides that termination proceedings should not be initiated by the state, even if 
the child has been in foster care for fifteen out of the previous twenty-two months, “if the child 
is an unaccompanied, refugee minor and the situation regarding the child involves international 
legal issues or compelling foreign policy issues.” N.M. STAT. § 32A-4-29(G)(7) (Supp. 2009). 
Alternatively, states could take the position adopted in State v. Maria L. (In re Interest of 
Angelica L.), 767 N.W.2d 74 (Neb. 2009). There, the Supreme Court of Nebraska stated that “a 
child ha[ving] been placed outside the home for 15 or more of the most recent 22 months does 
not demonstrate parental unfitness” but “merely provides a guideline for what would be a 
reasonable time for parents to rehabilitate themselves to a minimum level of fitness.” Id. at 92. 
 226. See supra note 208. 
 227. See Thronson, supra note 153, at 54 (discussing a family law case in Georgia in which 
the trial judge terminated the parental rights of both a child’s father, because of his immigration 
status, and the child’s mother, because she lived with and was financially dependent on a man 
who was an illegal immigrant). 
 228. Maria L., 767 N.W.2d at 94. 
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provided by states that already make this the law for incarceration. 
For example, Massachusetts provides that “[i]ncarceration in and of 
itself shall not be grounds for termination of parental rights.”229 
Oklahoma’s termination of parental rights statute has similar 
language.230 In a slightly different approach, Nebraska prohibits the 
filing of petitions to terminate if the sole basis for the petition is that 
the parent is incarcerated.231 Following the lead of these states by 
adopting similar positions for deportation proceedings could address 
the cultural bias problem for many immigrant parents.232 
States should also adopt laws that make illegal entry into the 
country irrelevant to the fitness inquiry. At least one state court has 
acknowledged that entering the United States is often undertaken for 
the benefit of the child.233 By adopting such laws, legislatures would 
prevent state courts from terminating a parent’s rights simply because 
she took an action believed to be in the best interests of her child. 
C.  Adherence to and Furtherance of the Vienna Convention 
Finally, to begin to solve the problem, it is necessary to ensure 
that the United States complies with its obligation to provide consular 
access to detained noncitizens. Article 36 of the Vienna Convention 
on Consular Relations (Vienna Convention) guarantees that when a 
noncitizen is “detained in any . . . manner” in another country, that 
country will notify the noncitizen’s own consular post so that consular 
officers can communicate, correspond, and visit with the noncitizen.234 
The consular officers may also arrange for legal representation for the 
 
 229. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 210, § 3(c)(xiii) (LexisNexis 2003 & Supp. 2010). 
 230. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10A, § 1-4-904(B)(12) (West 2009) (“[T]he incarceration of 
a parent shall not in and of itself be sufficient to deprive a parent of parental rights . . . .”). 
 231. See NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-292.02(2) (LexisNexis 2005) (“A petition shall not be 
filed on behalf of the state to terminate . . . parental rights . . . if the sole factual basis for the 
petition is that . . . (b) the parent or parents . . . are incarcerated.”). 
 232. Of course, a number of states take the opposite approach and make incarceration a 
factor that can demonstrate unfitness if it lasts for a certain period of time. See supra notes 194–
96. Although this is an understandable position in many cases, taking the opposite approach in 
the case of deportation is not incongruent. Parents have the right to take their children with 
them upon deportation, see supra note 43 and accompanying text, and in most circumstances 
will be able to resume a normal, healthy relationship with the child. 
 233. See Maria L., 767 N.W.2d at 93 (“[W]e do not conclude that Maria’s attempt to bring 
herself and her child into the United States, in the belief that they would have a better life here, 
shows an appreciable absence of care, concern, or judgment.” (emphasis added)). 
 234. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 36, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 
U.N.T.S. 261. 
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noncitizen.235 The United States is a party to the Vienna Convention 
and relies on it heavily in conducting U.S. consular activities.236 Two 
regulations adopted prior to the ratification of the Vienna 
Convention “fulfill the notification requirements” of Article 36.237 
One regulation requires that upon arresting a foreign national, the 
arresting officers “inform the foreign national that his consul will be 
advised of” the arrest unless the foreign national does want the consul 
to be notified.238 Though this regulation applies only to foreign 
nationals who are criminally detained,239 another regulation requires 
that “[e]very detained alien [including those held for immigration 
reasons] shall be notified that he or she may communicate with the 
consular or diplomatic officers of the country of her nationality in the 
United States.”240 
Rigorously adhering to the Vienna Convention could help 
alleviate cultural bias against illegal immigrant parents detained for 
deportation in several ways. The involvement of foreign consular 
officers might cause the United States to treat the immigrant more 
fairly and with less bias against her country of origin.241 The consular 
authority could also bring cultural sensitivity to the process through 
her knowledge of the culture from which the immigrant arrived in the 
United States, knowledge of the language of the immigrant, and—
particularly relevant to child custody cases—knowledge of the 
conditions in which children are raised in the immigrant’s country of 
 
 235. Id. 
 236. GARCIA, supra note 45, at 2. 
 237. Id. at 4–5. 
 238. 28 C.F.R. § 50.5(a)(1) (2010). If there is a treaty requiring notification, however, the 
consul will be notified regardless of the detainee’s wishes. See id. (“On the other hand, some of 
the treaties require notifying the consul of the arrest of a foreign national whether or not the 
arrested person requests such notification.”). 
 239. Id. § 50.5(a). Additionally, this regulation explicitly states that it is inapplicable to 
arrests made purely for noncriminal INS purposes. Id. § 50.5(b). Given that many illegal 
immigrants are first arrested for a crime before being recognized as noncitizens and transferred 
into immigration custody, it is possible that many would be covered by subsection (a) of the 
regulation. 
 240. 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(e) (2010). 
 241. See GARCIA, supra note 45, at 3 (noting that if a consular authority is involved, it 
“might take diplomatic or other steps to ensure that its national is treated fairly by the receiving 
State”). Presumably, involvement of the consular authority would also encourage the receiving 
state to engage in diplomatic behavior to ensure appropriate treatment of the state’s own 
nationals held in the sending state’s jurisdiction. 
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origin.242 Finally, the consular authority could help the immigrant 
navigate the U.S. justice system and attempt to ensure that the 
immigrant is not treated unfairly or differently because of her 
nationality and immigration status.243 
Despite the benefits of consular involvement, under the United 
States’ agreement to be party to the Vienna Convention and the 
regulations that serve to fulfill its notification requirements,244 
“foreign nationals are not always provided with requisite consular 
notification information following their arrest or detention.”245 When 
they are not notified, actual remedies, such as an injunction or 
damages, are often not available.246 Changes to federal law based on 
the Vienna Convention could ensure that immigrants are given 
notification of consular information and remedies when notification is 
not forthcoming. 
First, regulations for notifications to consular authorities in cases 
of immigration violations should be rephrased to mirror the more 
demanding level of notification required for criminal detainees. 
Federal officers are required to notify consular authorities of a 
foreign national’s criminal detention, unless she requests that 
notification not be made.247 Detainees held for immigration purposes, 
however, are merely notified of their right to communicate with their 
consulate.248 Requiring notification to the consulate of foreign 
nationals held for immigration purposes would better ensure that the 
 
 242. See, e.g., State v. Maria L. (In re Interest of Angelica L.), 767 N.W.2d 74, 83, 86 (Neb. 
2009) (relying on the testimony of a Guatemalan missionary to demonstrate the safety of Ms. 
Luis’s home for her children based on an understanding of Guatemalan community and 
educational standards). 
 243. See GARCIA, supra note 45, at 3 (listing “expertise in the laws and practices of the 
receiving State” and the ability to “arrange for the arrested national to receive better legal 
representation than he might otherwise receive” as benefits of the involvement of consular 
authorities); see also Maria L., 767 N.W.2d at 97 (Gerrard, J., concurring) (“The full 
participation of the consulate can help the juvenile and the juvenile’s parents by ensuring that 
their interests are represented . . . .”). 
 244. See supra notes 237–40 and accompanying text. 
 245. GARCIA, supra note 45, at 5–6. 
 246. See id. at 6 (“[T]he State Department has historically taken the view that ‘[t]he [only] 
remedies for failures of consular notification under the [Vienna Convention] are diplomatic, 
political, or exist between states under international law.’” (third and fourth alterations in 
original) (quoting United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 63 (1st Cir. 2000))); see also Maria L., 767 
N.W.2d at 90 (“Other jurisdictions have concluded that state courts do not lose jurisdiction for 
failing to notify the foreign consulate as required by the Vienna Convention . . . .”). 
 247. 28 C.F.R. § 50.5(a)(1) (2010). 
 248. 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(e) (2010). 
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consular authorities receive notification of the detention and are able 
to provide their services to the detainee.249 
Second, because “no federal law or regulation has been adopted 
to compel state or local law enforcement officials” to comply with the 
Vienna Convention, such law and regulations should be 
promulgated.250 Though there are some federalism concerns, the 
federal government can nonetheless achieve compliance by state and 
local law enforcement through the use of a federal funds act.251 To be 
most effective in child custody and parental rights cases, such 
regulations could also extend to requiring notification to consular 
authorities whenever the child of an immigrant is taken into custody 
by a state’s social services department.252 
Finally, for these laws to have meaningful force at the state and 
local level, immigrants should have recourse in court if federal, state, 
or local authorities fail to notify them of their consular rights or fail to 
contact their consulate. Some courts have recognized judicial 
remedies for violations of the Vienna Convention, but others have 
not.253 To make Article 36 effective as a tool for eliminating cultural 
 
 249. The HELP Separated Children Act would have required the Department of Homeland 
Security to ensure that detained parents of separated children are “granted regular, confidential 
and in-person access to consular officials,” as well as “free, unlimited, confidential phone calls to 
consular officials.” H.R. 3531, 111th Cong. § 9(c)(7) (2009). 
 250. GARCIA, supra note 45, at 5. 
 251. See id. at 21 (“Congress . . . might instead consider legislation that influences states and 
localities . . . through . . . legislation conditioning federal funding for state services upon state 
compliance with . . . Article 36 . . . .”). Federal funds acts are quite common in various areas of 
the law, such as drinking age laws, education, and family law. Such laws are likely to be upheld. 
Id. 
 252. At least one state has already adopted such a regulation. Nebraska law requires that 
the consular authorities be notified whenever the Department of Social Services takes custody 
of a foreign national minor or of a minor with dual citizenship. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-
3804(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2010). 
 253. Compare United States v. Banaban, 85 F. App’x 395, 396 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) 
(determining that the Vienna Convention creates no enforceable remedy for individuals), and 
United States v. Ademaj, 170 F.3d 58, 67 (1st Cir. 1999) (“[T]he Vienna Convention itself 
prescribes no judicial remedy or other recourse for its violation . . . .”), with Standt v. City of 
New York, 153 F. Supp. 2d 417, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“[T]he language of the [Convention], 
coupled with its ‘legislative history’ and subsequent operation, suggest that Article 36 of the 
Vienna Convention was intended to provide a private right of action to individuals detained by 
foreign officials.”), and United States v. Hongla-Yamche, 55 F. Supp. 2d 74, 78 (D. Mass. 1999) 
(“[T]his Court finds that Article 36 of the Vienna Convention does confer an individual right to 
consular notification, and that Hongla-Yamche has, therefore, standing to contest the alleged 
violation of that right.”). For a description of the various positions that federal courts have 
taken on the matter, see GARCIA, supra note 45, at 6 & nn.7, 29–30. 
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bias, the view of the former courts should be adopted. The most 
effective route would be to encourage states to codify this position in 
their own statutes under the suggested federal funds act.254 
CONCLUSION 
The increasing problem of illegal immigrants having their 
parental rights terminated as a result of their arrest and the initiation 
of deportation proceedings against them is one of the most troubling 
aspects of current immigration policy. It flouts well-settled 
constitutional law regarding the importance of the parent-child 
relationship and the due process rights of all parents, even those who 
have entered the country illegally.  
This problem, likely more widespread than published cases 
would suggest, exists primarily for two reasons. Cultural bias has 
caused judges to avoid applying or to misapply the clear and 
convincing evidence standard to questions of unfitness and to rely 
heavily on biased views of what is in the best interests of the child. 
This cultural bias has combined with the issues faced by prisoner 
parents in preventing the termination of their parental rights to form 
a perfect storm for immigrant parents. 
To solve this problem, the United States should address the issue 
at both the state and the federal level. Laws should reflect greater 
cultural sensitivity and should diminish the opportunities for judges to 
display their cultural bias. Government at all levels should comply 
with international treaties that provide a culturally sensitive advocate 
to immigrant parents. The federal government should reconsider the 
implications of the ASFA for illegal immigrant parents, as should 
states. Finally, laws regarding treatment of immigrant prisoners 
should be modified so that they are no longer a barrier to parents 
maintaining custody of their children. It is only with this 
comprehensive approach that the United States will be able to protect 
the constitutional rights of immigrants and their children. 
 
 254. See supra notes 45, 251 and accompanying text. 
